مراسلات متنوعة، تقارير، خرائط وغيرها من الأوراق المتعلقة بالشرق الأوسط [ظ‎‎٨‎٧] (٢٢٠/١٧٥)

36
expressed their inability to supply arms for the Hail campaign, it is to Ibn
Sand’s credit that he resisted the temptation to reply to Fakhri Pasha.
Another Turkish communication received in August he treated with simi
lar contempt—a letter signed by four leading chiefs of the Asir tribes, but
obviously, from its style and contents, dictated by Muhiyuddin Beg, the
Turkish Commandant and Mutasarrif in Asir, in which Ihn Saud was re
minded of the benefits accruing to the province of Asir from Turkish rule and
was called upon to join the signatories in defence of the true faith.
So much for such correspondence as is known to have been addressed to •
Ibn Saud by or on behalf of the Turkish authorities. In June a report,
emanating from Aden, indicated, apparently on good authority, that Ibn
Saud and the Turks had concluded arrangements, whereby certain officers
were to be allowed to pass down to Yaman to set the finances of the troops
serving there in order, but at no time did this report seem to me to be anything
but the fiction of some prejudiced brain. In any case, it was intrinsically
improbable on the face of it, and I never heard any more of the results of
the alleged arrangem’ent.
The only occasion, on which, so far as I know, Turkish Officers attempted
to pass through Najd, occurred in April, when, on my return to Riyadh, Ibn
Saud informed me that, having received information of the passage'of a Dar-
wish through Riyadh, he had stopped and arrested the man, who proved to be
a ceitain Qol-Agasi Qudsi Eftendi, an Officer of the Taman forces, endeavouring 1
to make his vay from Sanaa and Ibha via Riyadh to Medina and Constanti
nople with a considerable sum (,£ 1341) in Turkish notes and a number of
private letters, which contained little of interest and importance beyond the
information that another officer had left Ibha some three weeks or so ahead
of Qudsi Effendi bound for the same destination. Whether that officer got
through or perished on the journey it is impossible to say, but he was not in
tercepted by Ibn Saud.
As regards Qudsi Effendi, who remained in custody at Riyadh to the
end of the period under report, I expressed a desire to see him on my return
from W adi Dawasir, with a view to arranging for his despatch to the coast for
internment by the British authorities. My desire to visit him beino- com
municated to him he made it quite clear that, though he could not refuse to
see me, if Ibn Saud insisted on his doing so, his disgust for and hatred of infi
dels was such, that he would rather be spared the ordeal. In these circum
stances I respected Ins wishes and never saw him, though, hearing from another
source that he was in custody in circumstances of great hardship and discom-
or , i begged Ibn Saud to improve the conditions of his imprisonment. Qol
gasi Qudsi Effendi, for all his unreasoning fanaticism, had reason to be
grateful to an infidel for a very substantial alleviation of the miserable condi-
nearly two moirths^ he 1Ved “ the dun S e0Ils °f the Riyadh fort for
i/. ArmsinlVajd.
r. „ v , iew ° f the often-repeated reluctance of H.M.’s Government to supply
Ihn Saud with arms and the High Commissioner’s insistence on the inJivis-
ability of strengthening the Wahhabi forces on account of the possible deve
lopment of a \\ ahhabi menace, it is important to note that, while Government’s
pathms’of ibn m s tt id r !t d f * ahena ;, m K. to a certain extent, the sym-
dfstribution of arms l , cd of ‘ff. object owing to the Sharif’s lavish
aistnoution ot arms and ammunition among irresponsible elements of the
population of Najd in the mistaken belief that he was thereby securing their
allegiance. To this may be added the illicit traffic in arms and ammunition
for tf whl ? ‘i thp , re ?, e . e “ s '‘ttte doubt, certain Sharifian officials responsible
for the custody of military equipment, made considerate profits reSp0I1SlbIe
file traffic in arms and ammunition was carried on in Naid on a wholesale
r un^Thfle^ttSd’ hat^'t 1 ’“f ‘ UP “f ^ of MO
number received^rom^S^iarifian sl^s" butT t ^ ^
d“ d caL t”'
that in one way or another Naid secnrprl l Se circui ^. s t aIlces ma y be assumed
far short of 5,000, if we assume a roue-h ° f P ossi bly not
of ammunition brought away. * ^ P tage °* 0116 ri ^ e to ^0 rounds
Ibn SaudTiekHon^hir^.n^ubTectelindl: 6 ' 1 ’ W ° Wn WaS to
control the Wahhabi movement than before while “ WOr f position
increasing the strength of the tribes. ’ h le , at the same time, greatly