مراسلات متنوعة، تقارير، خرائط وغيرها من الأوراق المتعلقة بالشرق الأوسط [و‎‎٣‎٨] (٢٢٠/٧٦)

We have recently been discussing the ways in which such a situation might be
faced—
(a.) By the reinforcement of General Allenby.
(h.) By the reinforcement of General Maude.
(c.) By a French landing at Ayas Bay.
The question I raise is whether, if matters develop as I forecast, the solution
might not be immensely facilitated and the final smash-up of the enemy in Asia
rendered certain by the landing of a Japanese Army Corps at Basra early next year.
I am assuming that it could be transported in Japanese ships, escorted by Japanese
war vessels, and that the transport, supplies, and munitions would come direct from
Japan. Mesopotamia is the only available theatre of war where these conditions would
exist. It possesses the further advantage that its maritime approach is free from
submarine attack.
I am aware that objections may be raised to this proposal which are deserving of
very serious consideration. I doubt if they will come from any of our Allies France,
Italy, Russia (if she is still in the war), and America will probably say, “ If you like to
get the Japanese to help you in smashing the Turk and defeating Falckenhayn, it is
your concern rather than ours, and in so far as it will contribute to an Allied victory, it
will 1 jo all to the good. By all means go on.’
Nor do I imagine that the objections will come from our own military advisers.
Jdie Chief of the Imperial General Staff has air ady suggested that we should employ
Chinese troops (of very problematical military value) in Fgypt or at Aden. He will
hardly be likely to resent the use of so powerful a military ally as Japan in a secondary,
though very important, theatre of war, where her appearance would relieve the drain
upoii°the Western front and upon our resources elsewhere. His criticism is more likely
to he that her aid is not necessary.
The objections will more probably come from the India Office and the Govern
ment of India ; and the Secretary of State for India has already, in reply to a request from
me, favoured me with a general outline of the form which they might conceivably take.
It may be said that Japan will not render military assistance without demanding
her political quid pro quo in advance. I am not myself much impressed by this danger.
It is true that most of the Allies, before entering the war, have made a statement of
their claims, territorial or otherwise, and have sought to bind, or have bound, the other
members of the alliance to an acceptance of them by formal agreement. But Japan
entered the war three years ago, and I am not aware of any case in which an Ally,
merely became he has been asked to move his troops in this or in that direction, has
demanded blackmail before consenting to the operation. I doubt if Japan would
demand any terms at all as a preliminary condition. She might uemand them at toe
Peace Conference or later on, and that possibility must be carefully considered. But
I doubt her making them a condition at the start..
It may be urged that d she is concerned in the defence oi Mesopotamia she
will demand, commercial concessions, rights of settlement, &c., there later on, w hich may
be embarrassing to us. r lhe answer to this is twofold i Mesopotamia lie.s ahcad\ been
conquered and won by the valour of British and Indian forces alone. Japan, if she were
to come in now, would have had no share in that undertaking. ^ The^ future of
Mesopotamian administration, il w r e win the war and are able to retain it, nas already been
determined in outline, and does not admit of Japanese intervention at this stage. If,
however, her ambitions are commercial, what are the advantages which she could claim
now r or at the end of the war which we should not in any case be bound
to concede to her? Supposing that she desires after the w r ar to run a
subsidised line of steamers to Basra, could w r .e stop her any more than \\e
could stop her from running steamers to India itselt ? Supposing , she demands a
Japanese consul at Basra, could we in any case refuse her? Supposmg she demands
rights of settlement, will not that issue be governed by the municipal laws w hich w~e
shall make in the Basra <uid Baghdad vilayets? Is the danger of Japan acquiring a
powerful or menacing position in the Persian Gulf or Mesopotamia a serious one ? u ill
not all her energies bo concentrated for many years, possibly for generations to come,
upon China and the countries lying between China and India, possibly including India
itself (where she has been making since the war began most pertinacious efforts at
commercial penetration). Need w^e really be afraid of her in the Nearei Easi ?
It is very likelv that the Government of India, influenced by such alarms and oy a
latent resentment that India itself is not to obtain more of the spoils of Mesopotamia (if
the latter be retained) may advise against the, suggestion that we are discussing. I he