تقرير البعثة الخاصة إلى مصر بقيادة اللورد ميلنر، وأوراق ذات صلة [و‎‎١‎٩‎٠] (٤٧٣/٣٨٢)

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not due to the men but to the system. It is because they are, or can be represented to
be, imposed upon Egypt against her will, as the agents and symbols of foreign
domination, that hostility to them is easily excited. The grounds for such hostility
will disappear when they can no longer be regarded as instruments of a foreign
government, and tjieir efforts to maintain efficiency will then have an increased
amount of native support. For, as individuals, British administrators and the
British officers in the Egyptian army are not unpopular. The best of them not only
command the respect, but win the affection, of a people who are very qumk to
recognise capacity, especially when it is combined with graciousness and tact
Given time for reflection—and it is certain that nothing will be done in a hurry—it
is likely that these considerations will determine many Englishmen in the Egyptian
service to stick to their posts. And indeed Englishmen could perform no more
honourable service than in establishing a friendly partnership between Great Britain
and Egypt and assisting Egyptians to make a success of seli-governing institutions.
But while any general or rapid displacement of the British and other foreign
officials is not to be anticipated, it is nevertheless desirable to make careful provision
for those, with whose services the Egyptian Government may wish to dispense or who
may themselves wish to retire, when the new system comes into force. Such men
must be treated not only with fairness, but with generosity. For nothing could have
a worse effect upon Anglo-Egyptian relations in the future than that a number of
former officials should be left with a sense of grievance. In any Treaty between
Great Britain and Egypt their position will have to be absolutely safeguarded, and
the conditions of retirement carefully laid down after consultation with representa
tives of those concerned. Under the existing law Egyptian officials, who are retired
by the Government for reasons other than misconduct, receive pensions on a not
ungenerous scale proportionate to their length of service. No new arrangement can
infringe existing rights. But it is evidently necessary, in view of the altered circum
stances, to make special provision for those whose careers may be prematurely cut
short. And it is quite essential that men who under the new system retire of their
own accord, should receive the same favourable treatment as those with whose
services the Egyptian Government may choose to dispense. In ordinary circumstances
a man voluntarily resigning a public post before the normal time for his retirement
does so at a certain sacrifice. But this principle does not apply where the conditions
of service are essentially altered. In that case the official should have the right to
choose, whether he will or will not go on serving under the new conditions, and if
he prefers to retire, should be entitled to do so on the same terms as if his retirement
had been compulsory.
4. Reservations for the Protection of Foreigners.
To the general principle that the Egyptian Government should in future be free
to determine for itself what posts are to be filled by non-Egyptians, the memorandum
in Article IV, § § 3 and 4, makes two exceptions. According to these clauses, a
Financial Adviser and an official in the Ministry of Justice, whose special function
will be to watch the administration of the law as it affects foreigners, are still to be
appointed “ in concurrence with His Majesty’s Government.” It may be asked, in
view of what has already been said on this subject, why it was thought necessary to
make these exceptions. The answer is to be found in the special responsibilities
which under the proposed settlement Great Britain would assume for the protection
of foreign rights.
The two points of supreme interest to the foreign Powers whose nationals at
present enjoy special privileges under the Capitulations are the solvency of Egypt,
which is not only of importance to the bondholders but indirectly affects all foreign
capital and enterprise in the country, and the safety of the lives and property of
foreigners. To ensure these objects the Powers will certainly continue to insist on
the maintenance of some measure of foreign control. They have come to acquiesce
in the exercise of that control by Great Britain. But if Great Britain ceased to
exercise it, they would demand that some other Power or group of Powers should
take her place.
It is, however, a fundamental principle of the contemplated settlement that anv
powers, which may still be necessary to safeguard foreign interests in Egypt and to
assure foreign Governments that the rights of their nationals will be respected, shall
be vested in Great Britain. This is the reason for the stipulation that the two high
officials already referred to should continue to be appointed with the concurrence of
the British Government—the duty of the one being to ensure solvency, that of the