ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [ظ‎‎٧‎٩] (١٧٨/١٥٨)

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for Egyptians is quite as great as that of the negroid pagans who inhabit the
southern provinces. The Soudanese, whether black or Arabs, despise the Egyptians
as cowards, whilst the latter look down upon the Soudanese as barbarians and regard
service in the Soudan as tantamount to exile. But in spite of this complete lack
of sympathy between the two peoples, the Nationalist agitators in Egypt have
succeeded during the last four years in making the essential unity of the Soudan
with Egypt almost the chief plank in their political platform. Their success is
attributable to the two motives which are most powerful with Egyptians, love ot
money and anxiety for their water supply. Since 1899 the Egyptian taxpayer has
balanced the Soudan budget, whilst British officials have controlled the policy and
administration of the country. Apart from a loan for railway development of over
5,000,000/., on which no interest has yet been paid, the Egyptian Treasury has
contributed directly and indirectly very large sums to the Soudan. Thus it is the
Egyptian army which plays the part of a police force and is entirely paid for by
Egypt, who similarly defrays the cost of any military operations which the vast size
and necessarily loose administration of the territory may necessitate.
66. It is true that in return for all this expenditure Egypt has enjoyed complete
immunity from any threat to her water supply or to the peace of her southern
frontier, but of the value of the services thus rendered by the Soudan Government
will never be appreciated in Egypt by a generation which has forgotten the late of
the Egyptian military expedition led by Hicks Pasha. This force was almost entirely
annihilated by the Dervish hordes in 1883.
67. Anxiety about the water supply is only justifiable on the hypothesis that
Anglo-Egyptian relations will not always be friendly. Egyptian Nationalists,
however, are unceasing in their efforts to convert this hypothesis into a fact.
Consequently their knowledge that an increased water supply for Egypt is dependent
on the goodwill of the Soudan Government, who at any time can imperil the
prosperity of Egypt by inconsiderate schemes of development in the Soudan, cannot
fail to occasion them misgivings.
68. There is, therefore, a perfectly genuine desire on the part of Egyptians to
eliminate British influence in the Soudan in order that they may have a free hand
to make use of the whole volume of the Nile discharge for their own country, and to
recover, at the expense of the Soudanese, the money advanced by Egypt since the '
reconquest.
Egyptian Propaganda in the Soudan.
69. Egyptian Nationalist propaganda has made some impression in the Soudan
during the last four years, particularly in the towns where Egyptian clerks and 1
subordinate officials are fairly numerous. Even in the country districts the v
Soudanese, whose loyalty to the British connection is inspired more by dislike of
Egyptians than by any other consideration,- are uneasy lest His Majesty's
Government should attempt to placate Nationalist opinion in Egypt by allowing
Egyptians to take a growing share in the control and administration of the Soudan.
This uneasiness is bound to increase, and thus the ground will be prepared for
Nationalist propaganda to take firm root. The generation which can remember
the miseries of the Mahdi regime is fast disappearing, and with them will go all
gratitude for the peace and prosperity which British administration has produced.
70. Lord Milner and his colleagues were impressed by the danger of the
Nationalist demand that the Soudan should be regarded as an essential part of
Egypt, and it was therefore made unmistakably clear during their negotiations with
Zaghlul that the recommendation/of the mission did not apply to the Soudan. But
this, in itself, was sufficient to make the Egyptian demand more insistent snidlparfi
passu with British concession^ in regard to the status of Egypt/the Nationalist7 ,
clamour for the complete control of the Soudan has grown in extravagance. 0 1
The Soudan is not at present a Burden on the British Treasury.
71. Beyond a share in the cost of the military operations, which culminated in
the battle of Omdurman, and the expense of keeping a single British battalion in
Khartoum, the British taxpayer has not had to contribute anything towards the
administration and development of the country, though it is true that Soudan loans
under the guarantee of His Majesty’s Treasury have been raised in London for
about 10,000,000/. Hitherto it has in fact been possible through the tacit acquiescence