ملف من أوراق مطبوعة مصنفة تحت عنوان "التفاوض المصري" بين كرزون وعدلي باشا والوفد المصري [و‎‎٧‎٦] (١٧٨/١٥١)

5
21st August, Lord Milner informed the Seerotarv of State of the terms of the
proposed settlement, and asked that the full text should be telegraphed to Lord
Allenby. As Zaghlul and his colleagues had been provided with copies and intended
to make the terms public in order to sound public opinion in Egypt there could be
no question of withholding them from Lord Allenby. They were in fact published
by Zaghlul at the end of August.
20. So far as their interim report was concerned, the Milner Mission were well
within the limits imposed by their terms of reference, for although it recommended
the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Egypt whereby Great Britain
would guarantee the independence of Egypt, the chief attributes of a protecting
, % Power, viz., the control of foreign affairs and complete freedom to determine the
strength and distribution of British forces in Egypt, were reserved to His Majesty's
Government. The August proposals, on the other hand, in giving Egypt the right
| of diplomatic representation abroad and in confining the British army of occupation
to a definite locality were barely compatible with the terms of reference; they came,
therefore, as a great surprise to the British Government who determined to maintain
an attitude of complete reserve towards the Milner scheme until the full report ot
the mission had been received and carefully considered.
27. Some observations must be made upon the substance of this scheme, which
represented a bold attempt to solve the insoluble. It was designed to persuade the
EgyptiaiyThat it represented practically complete independence, but under the guise
/\ of a scheme of judicial reform, which would get rid of the Capitulations, it made the
British High Commissioner a permanent and very important part of the executive
machinery of government and retained in his hands much of the power which the
British agents and consuls-getieral had been accustomed to enjoy in Egypt before the
war. The coming into force of the treaty implementing this settlement was made
contingent on the prior acceptance by the capitulary Powers of the scheme of
judicial reform. Negotiations had been opened with these Powers in the early
summer of 1920, but "by the autumn it became apparent that their hostility to the
abolition of the Capitulations could not be overcome within a reasonable lapse of
time. But if the capitulary Powers were hostile to the scheme of judicial reform,
the Zaghlulists were even more opposed to it, as they speedily realised that the draft
judicature laws, which were an essential part of the scheme, conferred on the British
High Commissioner powers which in practice would greatly curtail the apparent
independence offered by Lord Milner.
28. None the less,"and in spite of a very half-hearted endorsement by Zaghlul
* , » himself, the suggested terms of settlement were favourably received by the majority
of Egyptians, who were astonished at the liberality of the proposals. It was, how
ever Noilly in consonance with Oriental character that their acceptance was qualified
« . with reservations which, in the first instance, were no more than pious aspirations,
but with the passage of time became fundamental conditions, which had even under
gone a process of expansion by the time official negotiations came to be undertaken
in the following year.
End of Milner-Zaghlul Conversations.
29. In November 1920 Zaghlul and his colleagues returned to London and Lord
Milner tried in vain to persuade Zaghlul to initial the heads of agreement as
Egyptian opinion had shown itself favourable. But Zaghlul displayed typically
Egyptian lack of courage at the critical point and refused to commit himself. The
negotiations were therefore discontinued on the understanding that the mission
would submit a report advocating a settlement on the lines of the published agree
ment, whilst Lord Milner expressed the hope that Ziaghlul’s delegation, the majority
of whom regretted their leader's refusal to seize the opportunity of concluding such
a favourable bargain, were to do their best to promote the acceptance of the proposed
settlement by their countrymen.
30. It has not always been sufficiently realised that, whatever His Majesty’s
Government and British opinion might think, Egyptians of all classes regarded the
I Milner Mission and His Majesty’s Government as synonymous, and consequently
believed that the latter could not honourably abate or go back upon an offer made by
* the former. . TT . _ _ . , ^
31. The Milner Mission and, in Egyptian eyes, His Majesty s Government were
committed to the heads of agreement published in August 1920, whereas Zaghlul, by
refusing to initial that document, had secured a tactical advantage and had retained
complete liberty of action in regard to those proposals.