أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎١‎٢‎٦] (٣٤٨/٢٥١)

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f have said enough to indicate that it is not on these lines that it will he of any
use to enter upon the proposed conversations. Those who will be present are, it has
hitherto been presumed, attending, not to discuss the rival merits, actions, or preten
sions of Turkey or Greece, but to end the conflict on terms which will be honourable to
both. Such was the spirit in which my memorandum had been prepared, and such was
the spirit in which 1 had hoped that it would be received.
It js neither necessary nor desirable to discuss here at length the terms of the
french counter-proposals which have been submitted with the Ambassador’s letter—upon
some among them I have indicated a provisional opinion to the Count de Saint-Aulaire.
1 heir general character, however, is in harmony with the tone of the despatch itself, and
confirms the impression produced by the latter. If they are to be regarded as a
statement of the extreme Turkish claim, which they have every appearance of being,
they indeed deserve full consideration from that point of view. But if they are to be
regarded as the reasoned contribution of the French Government to the solution of the
problem, which the French Foreign Minister intends to urge in their integrity at the
forthcoming conference, 1 cannot conceal my apprehension that the conference may be
of brief duration and that it will not be rich in results.
The fear of embarking upon a discussion, on which the eyes of Europe will be
fixed, hut which might be attended with such a consequence, is an additional reason
w T hy His Majesty’s Government must be reluctant that their representatives should
enter it with so doubtful a prospect. It would seem to be an essential condition of
success that there should be a mutual recognition, in respect both of attitude and of
terms, of the spirit in which the case should be approached.
There remains a further point of the highest importance which ought also to be
cleared up before any discussion can profitably begin, but which is left in doubt by the
terms of the French despatch. It is stated in the third paragraph that neither the
trench Parliament nor French public opinion will allow’ of coercive measures being
taken against the Turks to compel them to accept terms adopted in favour of the
present Greek Government, and that the French Government will not in any way
participate in any action, of any nature whatsoever, tending to impose such terms upon
the Turks.
If the proposition here laid down be that it would be unfair to impose forcibly
upon the Turks a solution of a markedly Greek complexion, there can be no more
objection to such a thesis than to the corresponding proposition that it would be unfair
to impose a markedly Turkish solution upon the Greeks. His Majesty’s Government
can readily join the French Government in accepting either or both propositions,
but inasmuch as the object of the conference is not to devise either a pro-Greek or a
pro-Turk solution, but to arrive at a decision which is fair to both, the above passage
still leaves in obscurity the question what in the opinion of the French Government is
to he done when such a decision has been reached by the three Allied Pow r ers. Is it
the contention of the French Government that it is in no case to he enforced upon the
'Turks in the event of their declining it, and that the French Government will in no
circumstances participate in such enforcement, but that, on the other hand, as the
passage seems to imply, it may be enforced upon the Greeks, should they refuse, and
that the French will join in such enforcement? Or is the argument that the decision
is not to be enforced on either party, and that the resumption of the conflict is to be
witnessed by the Powers with helpless indifference ?
In order to elucidate this very important question it seems desirable to examine
with some precision the probable or possible course of events. Always assuming that
the three Powers have come to an agreement as to the terms to be offered, is it
contemplated by the French Government that when, either at Constantinople or
elsewhere, these terms are expounded to the Greeks and the Turks, the former are to
accept, on the strength of the attitude of M. Gounaris, while the Turks are to be at
libeity to refuse? And if refusal be the course adopted by either party, is a different
treatment to be meted out to both ? Is the Greek to be coerced, but the Turk to
remain free ? And, if so, what can be the defence of such a differentiation? Whv
should a different procedure be adopted with regard to the Turkish Peace Treaty than
has been followed with regard to all the other Peace Treaties? In this case be it
remembered, it is not with the Greeks that the treaty is being made. They are
belligerents, but they are not enemies. On the contrary, they are still and have been Allies.
The Turks, on the other hand, have been and still are not merely belligerents, but enemies,
inasmuch as they have not ratified the Peace Treaty which they signed. Why then should
they receive different treatment from that which has been dealt out to every other enemy
Power with whom peace has been made by the Allies? From no quarter has the