أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [و‎‎٩‎٦] (٣٤٨/١٩١)

3
put before them by French groups. I could not help asking what all this meant.
Even if the localities concerned were inside the French zone of special interest, the
suggested concessions appeared to me to travel far beyond the spirit of the Tripartite
Agreement. If they were outside, surely the concessions were in direct conflict with it.
The letter went on to invite the collaboration of French professors and teachers in
the schools not of Cilicia alone, but apparently of every part of Turkey, and ended by
inviting French capitalists to enter into economic and financial relations with the
Angora Government—again without any geographical limitation. I did not know, of
course, what view would be taken of these proposals by the French Government, or
how far M. Franklin-Bouillon had committed them on the matter; but that a local
arrangement of a relatively minor character for the evacuation of French troops, or the
release of French prisoners, should have been expanded in this elastic fashion to
include this vast motley of interests and concessions seemed to me one of the most
unusual diplomatic achievements of which I had ever heard.
Before concluding, I alluded to a further report which, although it was not
supported by anything that appeared in the agreement or in the letter, had yet
reached me from more than one quarter, that the French had tried to procure, or had
procured, the monopoly of the provision of French officers and instructors in the
gendarmerie—again not in Cilicia alone, but in Anatolia, without limitation. I .could
hardly believe that such was the case, since any such provision would be entirely
contrary to the arrangement already concluded between the Powers, by which the
future gendarmerie was to be international in character.
I said that the Ambassador must pardou me if I sought insistently for further
information upon all these points. I could not, I said, conceal from him that the sum
total of them had left upon the minds of myself and my colleagues a very painful
impression, and I hoped very earnestly that the majority of the apprehensions, to
which I had given expression, would turn out to be unfounded, and would be dispelled
by the explanation which it would be in his power to give.
The Ambassador interrupted me at various points of my narrative to inform me
that whatever might be the answers returned by his Government on the points which
I had raised, he was certain that they regarded the agreement as one of a purely local
character ; so much so, that they did not even propose to submit it for ratification to
the French Chamber. It was merely a restricted arrangement between Angora and
themselves with regard to Cilicia, and he felt convinced that the provisions, as to
which I had expressed alarm, could only be applicable to the zone in which, under the
Tripartite Agreement, it had been agreed that French interests should be recognised
as predominant. He took great credit for the fact that there had been no attempt to
discuss such wider issues as Smyrna and Thrace, and the conclusion of a general
peace with Turkey, and he seemed to anticipate that, in reply to my charge that the
French Government had been dealing with Angora as though it were the Government
of Turkey, they would say that the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, if accepted by the
French, would be submitted to the Constantinople authorities He did not contest that
the questions which I had put were of a very important and serious nature, and that on
the face of it the language both of the agreement and of the letter appeared to suggest a
wider field of action and consequence than he had himself predicated. It might be that
M. Franklin-Bouillon, who was a person of very ebullient nature and not used to
official negotiations, had done rather more than was expected of him, and had placed
matters in a light which was open to criticism. All this would be elucidated in the
enquiry which I had asked him to make.
I represented to the Ambassador in taking leave of him that the question was one
to which we attached great importance, and that if we were shortly to reopen Allied
negotiations for the settlement of the entire Eastern question it was indispensable that
there should be removed from our minds the suspicion that one of our Allies had taken
independent action, or sought to secure special advantages behind the backs—and, as
it would appear in some cases, to the distinct detriment—of the others.
The Ambassador did not express any surprise at the manner in which I had
spoken to him, and his defence of the procedure of his Government—such as it was —
would not, I think, have secured him a favourable verdict, even from a tribunal of his
own countrymen.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.