رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [و‎‎١‎٨‎٥] (٤٤٢/٣٦٩)

309 The Trans- [ 25 Ma
1914] Persian Railway. 310
structing a railway from Julfa to Tabriz, and
a syndicate in this country have an option
and are engaged in making the survey for a
railway from Mohammerahto Khoramabad.
That is quite different from the Trans-
Persian railway, which has for its object the
linking up of India with the general system
of European railways. I do not know
whether the- noble Marquess can say, if this
survey is going to be prosecuted, who is
going to find the money. I understood
many years ago that the Societe d'Etudes
were interested in this connection, but
that they had abandoned it; and if the
survey is going to be continued I should
like to know who is going to bear the cost
of it.
I will not depart from my undertaking
not to enter into a general debate, but I
will say that any scheme for a Trans-
Persian railway would be the least beneficial
scheme for Persia. Commercially, it would
be absolutely unsound, and therefore any
money spent on the undertaking would
have to be imposed upon the finances of
India. That would be a direct burden on
the Indian Exchequer; also an indirect
burden would be added, because you would I
have to increase the military forces of India :
and give greater naval protection. Therefore
in my opinion this is one of the most im
portant questions involving the welfare
and integrity of our Indian Empire. Added
to this, there is the information given in
tb-day’s newspapers that His Majesty’s
Government are going to be interested to a
large extent in the development of the oil
fields of Southern Persia.
*Lorjd SYDENHAM: My Lords, the |
railway question to which my noble friend
has drawn attention is one which raises
many issues of the greatest importance to ;
British interests in Persia. I do not know
anything that can be more unsatisfactory !
and even more melancholy than the present i
condition of affairs in Persia and our rela
tions to that unhappy country. We have
a large sphere of interest in Persia, and we
seem to exercise no influence in it. We
have responsibilities in Persia which we
do not take any steps to fulfil. We
have rights of which we do not make use—
rights which we can never abandon—and,
finally, we have a number of interests which
we are bound to safeguard. It appears to
me that the future of Persia and our
relations to Persia will depend to a very
O 570) H
great extent upon the construction of
railways. Therefore it does seem most
desirable that we should know clearly
how the railway question stands.
Our position in regard to railway con
struction in Persia, as I understand it,
rests mainly on two instruments or
assurances. In the first place, there was
the assurance given us by Nasr-ud-din
Shah to the effect that if any railways were
constructed in Northern Persia we should
be empowered to construct railways in
Southern Persia. That assurance is our
charter for railway construction in Persia,
and I assume it still holds the field. Then
came the Anglo-Bussian Agreement, which
parcelled Persia into two spheres of in
fluence with a neutral zone of extra
ordinary shape and containing most of
our interests lying in between. I believe
I am right in saying that Eussia has
formally recognised our special interests
with regard to the Gulf Provinces of Persia
which lie entirely within that neutral zone,
and that when the Agreement was con
cluded wfith Kussia both Powers arranged
to recognise any previous treaties, rights,
or concessions obtained by either of them.
If that view is correct the Anglc-Eussian
Agreement may be said to confirm the
assurances given to us by Nasr-ud-din
Shah. But there is something more
than that. The Persian Eailway Syndi
cate has obtained priority of rights to
construct three railwaj's from the
Gulf inland—namely, Mohammerah to
Khoramabad, Bushire to Shiraz, and
Bandar Abbas to Kerman. I assume
that this syndicate still has that option
of constructing those railways and that
the option is not contested, but these
railways seem important if the Gulf
Provinces are to be tranquillised and
if their resources are to be peacefully
developed. All these railways lie within
the neutral sphere laid down in the Anglo-
Russian Agreement. It therefore does
seem vital that our position in this neutral
zone should be placed beyond all doubt,
and, if necessary, that that position should
be re-defined.
As regards the Trans-Persian railway
project, in which I do not include the
link connecting with India along the
Mekran coast—that introduces a number
of ether considerations which would have
to be thoroughly confide kg later on. But