‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎١‎٣‎٨] (٣٨٦/٢٨٠)

this vessel to remain on .hoard of her in ordihnry circumstances. We. are also
aware that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have more tliam once
declared their objection to, any sea-going armed vessel being in commission
unless she be under the control of the Admiralty. We trust, however, that we
may be able,to adduce arguments which will show that the time has come to
change the policy hitherto adhered to in this matter.
2. We apprehend that the objections of the Admiralty will bo to the effect
that when in 1862 the Indian Navy was converted into the non-combatant force
now called the Royal Indian Marine, the Royal Navy undertook all those
duties up to.that.time performed by the Indian Navy, which could not; ho
carried out by a non-combatant, service ; that for this purpose certain of His
IVlajesty’s ships are maintained in Indian waters, towards the cost of which
India contributes a subsidy ; that if the Government of India are not satisfied
that the subsidised vessels are adequate for the due performance, of the duties
referred to, it will be possible to consider the question of increasing their
number on the understanding that the subsidy paid by India will be corre
spondingly increased ; that the main object of abolishing the Indian Navy was
to consolidate naval authority in Indian waters, and that to allow a sea-going
vessel to be armed but not under the orders of the Admiral commanding His
Majesty’s East India squadron would he to introduce a divided authority
which would he inconvenient and dangerous; that an armed vessel not com
missioned by the Admiralty would have no status and be little better than a
pirate; and finally that the ships of the Royal Indian Marine have duties to
perform.for which they were intended, and for which they are very useful, but
which are in no respect of a combatant nature. We will endeavour to meet
these objections in detail before we proceed to state the reasons which have led
us to make our present representation.
3! First as regards the employment of His Majesty’s ships in Indian
waters and the contribution paid by India towards their maintenance, we have
no desire to interlcre with tjiis arrangement in any nay; the sums paid
annually by India are intended to cover both the extended duties which are
included in Lord Rosebery’s definition in 1895 of the term “ Indian purpose,”
and also those minor duties of policing the coasts, which are performed in the
Australian colonies by colonial ships ; we do not propose or desire to relieve the
Royal Navy of any of those duties in so far as they are performed by them.
Nor do wo wish to urge the need for an increase to the subsidised squadron, for
although, as we shall show presently, we consider that the work done by those
ships in the Persian Gulf might with advantage be supplemented! by some
further force; wmare of opinion that this object can be fully attained by the
vessels now at our disposal provided they he used to the best advantage. As to
the objection that a dual naval authority in Indian waters could.not be tolerated
we reply that we should be far from suggesting such an.impracticable arrange
ment. We do not propose that any vessels of the Indian Marine should carry
an armament in time of peace, except those told, oil for such special service
as the policing of tlie Persian Gulf; while on such service they should be as
completely under the control of the Naval Commander-in-Chief as is ILM.S.
Sphinx—Ike special Persian Gulf vessel. The administration of such vessels
would of course be under the Government of India, but there would be no
more inconvenience or anomaly in this than there is in maintaining a British
Armv in India under the control of the Governor-General, hut administered
under the orders of the A\ ar Other', or in placing a contingent of the Indian
Army under the ALar Office for a particular service, or in including sailors and
marines in a force, under a general officer in the field.
4. When questioned on this subject by the Royal Commission on Indian
Expenditure in 1890, Vice-Admiral Sir W*. A. _ Kennedy, lately Naval Com-
mander-in-Chief on the Fast Indian station, objected that unless commissioned
as men-of-war, and flying a flag and under tire orders of the Admiral, armed
vessels would have no status and could not be regarded as anything better than
pirates. We have already stated, that we should never propose that armed
vessels should cruise about Indian waters without any control by the Admiral,
but in our opinion putting vessels under the Admiral is a very different thing