‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎١‎٣‎٤] (٣٨٦/٢٧٢)

"just described must, he thought, he modified because of his inability to trace
among the records in the Tehran Legation the original Persian of: the Shah’s
authorisation of 1S68, a copy of which was forwarded to your predecessor with
our Secret despatch No. 56 (External) of 7th May 1903. We do not appreciate
the force of this argument. The absence or the loss of the Persian original
cannot possibly alter the facts that the concession was granted; that it was
acted upon for 12 years ; and that incontestable traces of occupation still
survive on the spot. It appears to ns, therefore, to he open to llis Majesty’s
Government to adopt whichever method of procedure they may prefer.
11. The choice may be expected in part to turn npon the present attitude
of the Persiafl. Government and the policy that it is desired to pursue towards
them The experience of His Excellency the Viceroy during his recent
visit to Bushire, the subsequent behaviour of the Persian Government with
regard to that incident, and the general tone of unfriendliness that has
characterised their recent communications, undoubtedly justify the adoption of a
firm attitude, and will probably not have predisposed llis Majesty’s Govern
ment to any unnecessary display of courtesy. In these circumstances, it
may be thought desirable to act upon Sir. A. Hardinge’s advice, and to restore
the telegraph station without more ado. We should he grateful for early
instructions on the subject, in order that tbe cable may be laid the
necessary buildings re-erected during the present cool season, bailing the
adoption of this plan, we think that the second alternative would ho preferable
to the first, although it is to be feared, as anticipated by Sir A. Hardinge in
his letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne of 27th June 1903, that any procedure
tint might open the door for discussion or protest, could not fail to be attended
by considerable delay.
12. In either case tbe Persian Government might be conciliated by the
propos’d to carrv on the telegraph wire either by land or by sea from llenjam
to Bunder Abbas. When the Viceroy was at the latter place, he was earnestly
pressed both by the local traders and also by tie Salar-i-Moazzam, Governor of
the Gulf Ports, to lend his assistance to the connection of Bunder Abbas
lw telegraph wirh the outer world ; and it is scarcely credible that the Persian
Government, unless they mean to be deliberately unpleasant, should not
welcome an extension which will he both of political and of commercial
advantage to them. Should they do so, they might opportunely be reminded
that undertheConventionof 2nd April 1868, we possess the right to continue
our land line from Jask to some point between that place and Bunder Abbas,
a phrase which might he interpreted as applicable to any spot short of Bunder
Abbas itself, such as the British Consulate at Naband, four miles on the Jask
side of the town.
13. In the event of His Majesty’s Government accepting our proposals for
the immediate re-institution of a cable station at Henjam, we trust that they
will, upon reconsideration, consent to bear at least one half of the cost of the
arrangements as requested in our Secret despatch No. 56 (External), dated the
7th Mav 1903. The telegraph is asked for in the main m the interests ot the
naval squadron which is maintained in the Persian Gulf by His Majesty s
Government : and also on political grounds, which are divided in even propor
tions between ihe Imperial Government and tbe Government of India. l ie
larger part of the expenditure on the shores of the Gulf is already borne by
Indian revenues : and it does not seem fair that any fresh measures that may he
required to sustain our influence on the sea-the charge of which has hitherto
been assumed by the Home Government (with substantial contributions from
ourselves) should he debited exclusively to Indian funds.
14 We have now detailed at some length the proposals which we recom
mend for the protection of our paramount naval, strategical, and political
interests in the Persian Gulf. It seems to us most desirable that the oppor
tunity of acting while action is still easy, and before we can be forestalled,
should not be sacrificed: and we trust to receive early permission (in the base
of Henjam, which has already been accepted in principle, if possible by tele
graph) to proceed in the manner describe^.