‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٦‎١] (٣٨٦/١٢٦)

(a) Or more literally, that so&e or certain South Persian customs.
CHAPTER II.
Financial position: loans.
The ever-increasing financial difficulties of the Persian Government rendered
necessary, recourse to foreign loans and thereby the extension of foreign influ
ence was* greatly facilitated. It is necessary, therefore, to give a short retrospect
of the history of such loans and the measures adopted by Lord Curzon’s Gov
ernment to ensure that British interests were protected.
2. In 1892, popular opposition to the Tobacco Regulation led the Persian
Government to cancel the Persian Tobacco Concession belonging to a British
Company and Russia offered to lend them £500,000 for the payment of the
compensation which became due to the Company. Lord Salisbury then inter
vened and instructed Sir F. Lascolles, the British Minister at Tehran, to inform
the Amin-es-Sultan that any act by which the Shah handed over to a Foreign
Government his control over the customs revenue of the southern ports of Persia,
would be an alienation of his sovereign rights to which Her Majesty’s Govern
ment would be justified in objecting, and against the validity of which a formal
protest would be made.
3. The same warning was conveyed by His Lordship in 1897, when it
was rumoured that the Persian Government were negotiating a loan with Messrs.
OppenheinPs branch bank at the Hague, and the Hon’hie Mr. C. Hardinge, the
Charge d’Affaires at Tehran, was instructed to represent to the Shah that it
would be a grave error of policy to pledge to foreign financiers the customs
revenues of the Southern Persian ports. An assurance was requested from
the Persian Government that under no circumstances whatever would the
control of the customs of Southern Persia be ceded to a foreign Power. The
Mushir-ed-Dowleh on October 23rd, 1897, replied by giving the following
assurance :—
t< You have written that there was a rumour that the customs of Southern Persia (a)
wouhl be plac -d under foreign supervision and control as guarantee for a loan, I therefore take
this occasion of informing the Legation that this rumour is without foundation, and that they
will never be placed under foreign supervision and control. ”
4. On 19th March 1899, Sir M. Durand reported to Lord Salisbury that the
Persian Government were considering a project for a French loan with Russian
support, and that the security to he given was the general customs revenue of
the country with the right of appointing controllers in case of default. There
upon Lord Salisbury directed the British Minister to repeat to the Sadr-i-Azam
the warning which had already been given formally on more than one occasion,
that anv arrangement which would tend to place the control of the customs of
the southern ports of Persia in the hands of a foreign Power would be resisted by
Her Majesty’s Government. Up to this point the phrase employed m convey
ing our prohibition had been either “customs of the southern ports of Persia
or “ customs of S mthern Persia, ” and language of the same wide meaning was
us^d both by Sir M. Durand and the Government of the Shah in the communi
cations which ensued ; but on 7th April 1899, Lord Salisbury introduced a new
expression when he telegraphed to Sir M. Durand that the Persian Minister in
London had been told that the prosperity of Persia waL a matter of great interest
to H-r Majesty’s Government who much regretted their inability to offer more
effective help in the matter of the loon, but that the political interests of Her
Majesty’s Government had to he studied and such interests were incompatible
with the exercise of control or jurisdiction by a European Power over Persian
Gulf ports. His Lordship also renewed the above intimation often previously
given to the Persian Government and informed the Persian Minister of
His Lordship’s willingness to communicate the same to any lenders who may be
disposed to rely for their security ou the proceeds of these ports.
5. Lord Salisbury’s message was communicated by the British Minister to
the Sadr-i-Azam, and although nothing passed at the time to suggest that