‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند. الجزء I - الخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٢‎٥] (٩٢/٥٥)

63
taken until the extension of the British protectorate in Arabia had been
carefully considered both from the political and from the military point of
view. At the beginning of 1903, in connection with the aggressive designs
of the Turks in El Kat.r which had then become manifest, Lord Curzon again
suggested the - conclusion of an agreement between the British Government
and the Sheikh. In November 1903, on the eve of his cruise in the Persian
Gulf, during which it was thought that Sheikh Ahmad might seek an inter
view with the Viceroy in Bahrein, Lord Curzon asked to he informed of the
final decision of His Majesty’s Government in regard to British protection of
El Katr : the reply was that in view of the adherence of the Turks to the status
quo, as exemplified in the abandonment of their scheme for new Turkish Mu-
dirates, negotiations for a British protectorate could not properly be undertaken,
and that in these circumstances communications to the Sheikh must he limited
to assurances of continued friendship so long as he should abstain from enter
ing into engagements with other powers. Sheikh Ahmad, however, did not
appear in Bahrein and the assurances authorised remained undelivered A
few months later, in March 1904, Lord Curzon pointed out to the Secretary of
State that the status quo which His Majesty’s Government desired to recognise
and maintain included the withdrawal by Turkey of any claim to administrative
control or suzerainty over El Katr, and that the failure of the Turks, so far,
to act up to their assurances in this matter left His Majesty’s Government free
to reconsider the question of protection ; he sugge»ted therefore, that the time
was opportune for concluding an agreement with Sheikh Ahmad under which
the latter should bind himself not to enter into relations w r ith, not to receive
the representative of, and not to cede territory to, any foreign power : the
agreement would thus substantially resemble those entered into with the
Trucial Chiefs from which no inconvenient obligations had been found to
result. His Majesty’s Government were sensible of the inconveniences which
might arise, in the suppression of piracy or the protection of the pearl-
banks from outside interference, through the non-existence of an agreement
between the Sheikh and Government; but they doubted whether the objects
to be attained by the proposed agreement were of sufficient importance to
counterbalance the suspicion and ill-will which it would be calculated to
arouse in the minds of the Turkish Government; and they requested an ex
pression of Lord Curzon’s views as to the possibility of concluding some
modified arrangement less likely to wound Turkish susceptibilities Lord
Curzon considered that any agreement concluded must, in order to strengthen
the Sheikh’s position, be of a public and open character and he depreca-
ted. the introduction of precautions and reservations which might defeat
their own object, which might be held to imply for the first ^ time the
existence of lurkish rights in El Katr, and which might possibly pre
clude a completely satisfactory agreement at some more opportune season*,
as an alternative, however, he suggested that Sheikh Ahmad might formally
admit that the treaty of 1808, concluded with his father, was binding upon
himself also—a step which would afford a basis for a certain degree of ^British
control o\ei the maritime relations of the Sheikh with foreigners. His
Majesty’s Government, however, saw no advantage in a revival of the agree
ment of 1868 because, for the purpose in view, it could only be made effective
by gi'ing it an interpretation considerably in excess of what its actual terms
would hear ; and, having regard to the general sense of insecurity and suspicion
prevailing in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, they were unwillin°* to
raise any question touching the status quo in that quarter. This decision was
reached in February 1905, after which there were no further proceedings in
the matter. 1 °
The islands of the Bahrein archipelago, though subject to a British protec-
Bahrein. torate, were the scene, during the period
r i • i i i • . under review, of incessant political trouble
for which the obstinacy and incompetence of Isa, the ruling Sheikh, were
chiefly responsible ;m 1901 these difficulties culminated in an open rJpture
between the Sheikh and the British Government. The first symptom of some
thing amiss was a burglary committed in 1899, in which two British Indian
subjects were wounded and property belonging to the British firm of Tracis