مجموعة ١٠٣/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. العلاقات الفارسية الروسية" [و‎‎٨‎٥] (١٩٠/١٦٩)

, A
With the Compliments of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
j OUTWARD TELEGRAM 7.5.40.
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government, and should be
(E. 1864/G-)
kept under Lock and Key.]
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* AMENDED COPY*
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION AND W.
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IRAN
Cypher telegram to Sir R*Bullard (Tehran)
Foreign Office, 2nd May, 1940o 9c15
No.84.
sssssss
SECRET.
My immediately preceding telegram [of May 2nd:
replacement of British personnel in Iranian aircraft
factory],
I should also welcome your considered personal
opinion about reports that Iranian Government'have agreed
to ulace aerodromes at disposal of Soviet Government in
certain circumstances, possibly those foreseen in Article 6
of Perso-Soviet Treaty of 1921 [whereby Soviet Union might
send forces into Persia if latter were threatened and seemed
mable to xxrotect herself] and snould be glad to learn
whether any independent confirmation is obtainable.
2. I can understand^that whether or not the Shah thinks
it really likely that His Majesty's Government would infringe
Iranian neutrality he may feel need in times like these of
insuring against such an eventuality, just as he might
possibly like to insure secretly with His Majesty's
Government against the eventuality of Soviet aggression.
He may genuinely think that His Majesty's Government might
sometime be tempted to violate Iranian territory in order to
bomb Baku or to protect their interests in the oil-fields
should he find it necessary to interfere with the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company concession in defence of what he would
no doubt regard as his just rights. The inability of His
Majesty's Government to supply him so far with arms, aircraft,
rails etc., on any really substantial scale and the check to
the development of his country caused by the Reprisals Order-in-
Council may all have helped, furthermore, to convince him
that His Majesty's Government are indifferent to his welfare,
if not actually interested in keeping him weak, even though
such an attitude would be unreasonable in face of release from
Trieste of so much war material. Simultaneously, if somewhat
iliogicallv, he may regard our inability to supply material
as proof that we would be powerless to help him in an hour
of peril. Finally the efrects of the war, including the
Reprisals Order, on^Iranian economy may have become so serious
as to have forced him to seek some closer understanding with
the Soviet Union.
ENCLOSURE IN WEEKLY
N(X 19 1 6 MAY 194Q
FROM SECRETARY, POLITICAL A
■BWETBEPT. IMOU OFHOI
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