ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎٤] (٤٥٠/٢٦٦)

These adjustments would merely amount to a “reintegration of what Italy had for
the most part obtained less than thirty years ago.” Ihe Government should see to it
that no new situation prejudicial to Italy’s reasonable expectations is created during
the war. The Egyptian press has repeatedly alluded to the Islet of Kamaran (ofi the^.
Yemen coast) as an ancient British possession, whereas it has always been under*
Ottoman suzerainty.
2. Direct Acquisitions and Actual Compensations.
Italy’s claim, already set forth at length (see “ Daily Review,” 17th August,
p. 10; 24th August, p. 9; 2nd September, p. 8) to a share in the partition of
Turkey in Asia, which shall include the largest Mediterranean ports and an effective
coast connection with the Bagdad Railway.
Over and above this programme (set forth in a sketch-map) there are various
accords, which might be negotiated with individual States, apart from the peace nego
tiations, such as a guarantee for commercial expansion in China, safeguarding of
Italian interests in Egypt and Palestine, settlement of the school question in Tunis,
connecting up of Massowah with Kassala by a short railway (if it proves necessary after
the enlargement of Port Sudan).
These demands are modest in comparison with what the Allies possess, and are
about to acquire.
For Italy they represent a simple rounding-off of existing rights of absolute
national necessities. They are based on a fair balance of power. If we were inclined
to go in, like our Allies, for a really Imperialistic policy, there are many other claims
we might fairly set up in the Far East, in Western and Central Africa.
The compensation claimed in the Mediterranean—our most essential aim—is
necessary, not only for the sake of balance of power, but to afford a suitable outlet for
our emigration, and to provide us with the minerals which Italy lacks, the raw materials
for her defence and her industry.
The programme represents an absolute minimum—what is absolutely necessary to
Italy’s existence as a Great Power.
[From the “ Daily Review of the Foreign Press ” (W.O.) of the 15th September.]
On the 10th September the “Idea” published a final summary of its various
articles on “ Italy’s Plights Overseas.”
I .—Rectification of present Colonial Frontiers.
(a.) Libya .—From France : the inclusion of the caravan route between Ghadames
and Ghat; and agreements securing free passage for trade with Borkum and Tibesti.
By this means alone could Tripoli recover part of her age-long trade lost since the war
with Turkey.
From England: the Oasis of Jarabut would facilitate the pacification of Italy's
Mohammedan “ entity,” the Senussi.
(b.) Ethiopia and Somaliland .—Ethiopia is exclusively an Italian question, and
Italy’s exclusive right of influence there ought again to be recognised without
limitations as once provided for in the Treaty of Uccialli. British Somaliland and
French Somali ought to be ceded to Italy, together with the Juba Valley and the
northern and north-eastern fringes of British East Africa from the coast to Lake
Rudolph, in order that Italy may possess unhindered access to Abyssinia.
(c.) Arabia’s Holy Places must be freed from all European influences and the
Yemen must be granted to Italy.
II .—Increase of Empire.
(a.) Asia Minor .—The “Idea’s” claims to Turkish territory have already been
analysed jn preceding summaries (e.g., 25th August-lst September), and the new r
problem for an Italian Asia Minor, as modified by the British occupation of Alexan-
dretta, is dealt with above Here Italy’s demands are summarised as : “ a zone which
shall comprise the chief ports of the Mediterranean and a real outlet of the Baghdad
Railwav.”
And (b.) Miscellaneous pretensions (to be negotiated with individual States):
commercial expansion in China ; the safeguarding of Italian interests in Palestine ; the