ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٩] (٤٥٠/٢٣٦)

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establish touch with the Anazeh, Sakhr, and Kerak Arabs, and through them with the
Druses and bands of deserters.
To supply these people with arms, money, and munitions, and get into better
communication with them should not require anything in the shape of an independent
military operation, and provided a successful issue attended the presumed military
action from Egypt, a very favourable turn might be given to events in the whole of
Syria and Palestine, besides putting the Sherif out of all danger.
The state of affairs in Syria and Palestine described in the two officers’ reports,
which have every evidence of being conservative and moderate statements, show that
we have the possibility of a rising of at least 65,000 men securely based on natural
strongholds and supported by large numbers of Bedawin, who are not counted in the
above figure.
Should the presumed military action and the hypothetical rising offer the Turks a
combination sufficiently formidable to oblige them to anticipate the contingency of
invasion and rebellion by the despatch of divisions from the Caucasus, there would be
at least the advantage of having drawn troops from more important fields.
1 Having dealt with the major issue, there are certain points of minor importance
which require consideration. Taken in geographical order, there is first the question of
Idris ; it is unfortunate that here we have the natural results of dealing with one
problem from two centres of control. Idris is the client of Aden, and writes to the
Governor of Aden, without apparent rebuke, complaining of the action of British officers,
while doubtless sooner or later the Sherif will do the same in Egypt when similar
j circumstances arise. Both men will naturally fall into these lines of conduct so long as
they are not dealt with by one person ; probably the Sherif is out for position and
Idris for money.
It is quite beside the point to feel resentful at Arab divisions when our own
arrangements tend to promote them. It is suggested that Idris should be made to
withdraw his criticisms of our officers, and should not be made a knight until he has
won his spurs by catching or killing some Turks. It might also be pointed out to
him that no matted how he may dislike the Sherif, he (Idris) will be heard of no
more if the Sherif falls, as the fall of the Sherif must mean the end of Arab inde
pendence in gross and in detail. Idris’s past record does not go to show that a little
plain speaking will upset him; he is a professional conjuror, viz., a worker of miracles,
and a very smart man about money ; has had his ups and downs, and knows when to
bluster and when to be discreet.
dhe^ fall of half suggests that, when the news reaches the Imam of Sanaa, he
will possibly reconsider his position in regard to the Turks. If any opportunity offers
of inducing the Imam to declare his independence and to expel the Turks, it would be
very advantageous in view of the persistent claims of Italy to interests in Yemen. No
minor considerations of post-war readjustments of our Aden frontier, or the annexation
of Taiz, should stand in the way of such an advantage.
The reports from Maskat, Bahrein and Koweyt are somewhat chilly : it is not
very flattering to British amour-propre to learn that at Maskat the story of the
Sherif s rising is not credited, and does not speak very well for our methods of
propaganda.
Of course, allowance must be made for the fact that the C.P.O., Basra, had
assumed that the idea of a confederation of Arab States was defunct; it naturally
follows that there could not be much enthusiasm in pushing what was supposed to be
an abandoned idea.