ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٦] (٤٥٠/٢١٠)

2
Sir Percy Zachariah Cox, C.P.O., Basra, subordinate to G.O.C. Force D in
Mesopotamia, but paramount in the Gulf under Government of India.
General Maude, G.O.C. Force D, supreme in Mesopotamia under C.I.G.S.,
London.
Foreign Secretary at Simla. Responsible for Mesopotamia-Gulf policy, and has the
right to deprecate any action which may be taken anywhere else as regards
Arabian affairs.
The Viceroy represents the Government of India, and is the channel between the
Gulf and London for political affairs.
The Secretary of State for India connects Government of India with War
Committee as regards two-thirds of Arab affairs.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs connects Hejaz and Arab movement with
War Committee, inasmuch as it affects Egypt or Entente Powers. Respon
sible for conduct of policy in Hejaz.
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7 That is to say, suggestions are liable to emanate from, or to be criticised by,
mmakmm persons, two civil Departments, the Government of India, and the War
Committee, without taking Paris and Rome into account.
It may be safely said that, with the exception of the ancient constitution of Poland,
it would be difficult to find a precedent for so complex or unworkable a political arrange
ment as the British system which has evolved itself in Arabia since the war broke out
in August 1914. Attention is drawn to this mess because instead of getting better it
gets worse, more and more people get a right of deprecation, and suggestions are fired
out from all quarters of the earth—Simla, London, Cairo, Paris, and Rome. The only
service which has any power of knowing what it is about and is capable of coherent
action, as far as Arabian affairs are concerned, being the Navy, since it alone is under
one head responsible to one Department. Admiral Wemyss has only contributed two
telegrams on other than routine in the last two weeks, the reason being that his
position is clear, and there is no necessity for Ids referring and reporting except on
matters of importance. For the rest there is an indescribable fog of suggestions
advanced and withdrawn, conferences summoned and abandoned, proposals and
counter-proposals, echoes and re-echoes, decisions and rumours.
For instance, the Rabegh question has been thrashed out again and again since the
13th September, when the situation was threatening ; yet on the 14th October Sir H.
McMahon is still in doubt as to whether the idea is wholly abandoned or no.
Colonel Wilson gets information from the Sherif per telephone regarding French
forces destined for Hejaz, based on a conversation between the Sherif and one of the
French Arabs; instead of comparing the news with Lord Grey’s telegram of the 13th
September stating precisely the composition of the French contingent or asking Colonel
Bremond what is coming, he telegraphs to Sir Henry McMahon, who in turn telegraphs
to London. AVith affairs in such a coil in Hejaz, what hope of efficient conduct of
political affairs can there be in Arabia as a whole ? So far things have not gone wrong;
the Sherif has done well enough, the pilgrimage is finished with for the year, the
railway is cut for the time being, and there are good hopes of the Sherif s holding his
own, if not of improving his position; but it is impossible not to see that if there is a
failure we shall find it difficult to discover a decent excuse for ourselves.
The Turks are almost certainly failing in men, we have a good force in Egypt and
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