ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎٧‎٠] (٤٥٠/١٣٧)

ekmis^ to exceptional treatment of families of foreign origin who had abandoned oil
lh Bnult^fdb fough, of courseflndiaf famiHes who have retard
tnui Kriush nationality are entitled to British protection.
_ Uaims of Egyptian merchants who can establish that they have not severed
1011 h b ?ypt are • he 0nly Aptian claims that we should press, and
retime a PP areilt tor protecting other Ottomans who do not accept the new
e^nrtttn ay ^ Iatei ' S!r H ' McMahon telegraphed [No. 1001] that the Sirdar had
expressed bis concurrence.
The Bank at Jeddah.
Ihie French Charge d’Affaires left a note at the Foreign Office on the 6th November
suggesting thiit the branch of the Ottoman Bank at Jeddah should be transformed
into an autonomous bank. A reply was given to the effect that His Mffiesty’s
t()\ eiminnt cad not consider that the position in Hejaz was yet sufficiently secure to
warrant the establishment there of a foreign bank, more especially in view of the
suspicions with which any banking institution is regarded by Arab opinion.
^ [Several pages or telegrams have come on this subject, but, having regard to this
re P y> tt hardly seems worth while to reproduce them.]
Report on the Situation in Hejaz by Captain N. N. E. Bray, King George's Own
Lancers.
[The following report, oated the 8th November, 1916, was made by Captain Bray at the
request of the Secretary of State for India.]
Before actually giving my appreciation of things military and political in Hejaz,
1 feel bound to preface it by these few observations :—
First .—J hat I fully realise the great responsibilty I incur in expressing my own
personal opinions and that they are so expressed only after the most earnest
consideration and the most careful observation of events as I had opportunities
to study them.
Secondly .—-That the lack of really valuable and authentic information forces me to
base many of my conclusions on my own slight military training and experience
and the small knowledge I have of the characteristics of the two opposing
forces in which we are interested.
Lastly .—That it is now over three weeks since I was in Hejaz, and that,
therefore, events may have materially changed, though from the reports I
have seen they do not appear to have done so to any extent.
The Military Situation as regards the Turks.
We can, I think, safely assume that the Turks have for offensive purposes, at or
near Medina, a full division. From information received, which appears fairly reliable,
they have already a large number of machine guns, and there is a prospect of then-
receiving more. In addition, they have for the support of this force about twenty-eight
mountain guns, sixteen.of which are of an old pattern. They appear also to have
collected a large number of camels, and to be buying and requisitioning more. We can
assume, therefore, that their transport will be mostly camel. They have, however, in
Medina four-wheeled country carts drawn by mules or camels. However, whatever the
nature of their transport may be. it will be considerable in quantity, in order to supply
the needs of a division, and slow moving. This is an important point to remember when
reports are received of long and sudden advances on the part of the Turks. For
reconnaissance work, they have three aeroplanes, and in place of cavalry, camel
squadrons. It would, I think, be unwise to wholly exclude the possibility of held guns
accompanying this column, especially when we remember the attempts against the
Canal. We know they possess wireless at Medina ; we must not therefore lose sight of
the possibility of their taking a wireless set with them. Quite separate from this force
we have to reckon with the possible help they will receive from Arabs friendly to
them or bribed by them to assist in the venture. I am quite'unable to say what their
numbers moy be, but they will be well armed and mobile, and wall be used as a screen
to keep off or delay the Sheriffs forces. Such, then, is an estimation of the Turks’
offensive power. For defensive purposes they have at least another division of mixed
troops for the protection of Medina, supported by held and mountain artillery.
[898—17] ' C