ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎٦‎٠] (٤٥٠/١١٨)

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Christian troops in any large numbers in Hejaz he is probably right. He, Sir R.
Wingate, also concurred in this view. He wished, he said, once more to place the true
situation before the Secretary of State so far as he was able to gauge it, now fully
confirmed by the information received from Colonels Wilson and Parker, and from
Sir Said’s delegate, who was admitted to the closest confidence of the Sherif and of his son
Abdulla.
1 . The Sherif has definitely burnt his boats with the C.U.P., and can be trusted
to be loyal to the Arab cause and to the Allies.
2 . Though the Arabs are really keen to see the Sherif’s cause triumph, and though
they hate the Turks, they are very susceptible to propaganda against Christians. The
C.U.P. threatens that they will fall under Christian yoke ; rather than this they would
prefer to remain under Turkish domination, with all its misgovernment, tyranny, and
oppression. Therefore the more the Allies can support the Sherif’s claims to inde
pendent sovereignty, and the more they can publicly proclaim their territorial
disinterestedness in Hejaz, the more likely is the Sherif to gain the solid adherence
of the tribes and to defeat the ends of the C.U.P., which is incessantly working from
Medina to undermine his cause.
In this connection, Sir R. Wingate said that he was under the impression that the
views of the French were slightly divergent on one point from the British. We should
welcome the capture of Medina by the Sherif, but the French seem to regard with some
alarm, in view of their future Syrian policy, the great increase of strength which the.
Sherif’s cause would immediately obtain by the active support of all Arab tribes in the
Syrian hinterland, they having sworn to rise in aid of the Sherif directly he obtains
possession of Medina.
3. The policy of assisting the Sherif with money, supplies, stores, instructors,
airships, &c., which we have adopted, is quite sound and is producing an excellent
effect. The presence of a Christian technical staff seems to be understood and is
warmly welcomed; the most fanatical of the Sherif’s adherents realises that it is only
thus that they can fight, with any chance of success, against well-armed Turkish
regulars.
4. The above facts were present in the Sirdar’s mind when making his recom
mendations, and Captain Lawrence’s views have not modified the carefully considered
plans elaborated in telegram No. 9 of the 7 th November [see Arabian Report XVII,
N.S , p. 2], which was concurred in by both Admiral Wemvss and Captain Lawrence
when they discussed the situation with him. in Khartum.
5. To avoid misunderstanding, Sir R. Wingate repeated those views as briefly
as possible :—
(a.) That the Sherif’s cause should not be allowed to fail is a matter of vital
importance to the Allies and to the British Empire.
(b.) Ihe Sherif’s position has been considerably consolidated by the support
already given.
(c.) r ! he present policy is sound in refusing to land any large bodies of Christian
troops at Rabegh. More mobile artillery is required, and this can be
supplied by the French ; Colonel Bremond, however, is opposed to sending
it to Rabegh without a supporting force of practically a brigade of artillerw
(d.) It is obvious that the holding of Rabegh and making it the base for the
Sherif s trained bands is strategically important, and already some progress
has been made on these lines; but,'in the event of a determined Turkish
advance, the impossibility of holding it without the support of a British or
French brigade is admitted.
(e.) It is to U hoped that the presence at Rabegh of warships and airships, and
the activity there, together with the exaggerated reports which these steps
will initiate, may have the effect, if not of actually preventing, at any rate
of delaying an advance in force of the enemy (already hampered by difficulties
of transport and supply), and so give more time to the Sherif to organise his
forces and undertake that independent action against the Turks which is so
desirable. _ More time wouM also be given to the G.O.C.-in-C. in Egypt to
organise his offensive from Sinai which, being a direct menace to the Heiaz
, rai . W1 " be of the greatest value to the Sherif’s movement
(./) a, with a view of recapturing the Holy Places, the Turks do advance south
ti om Medina, that advance should be opposed by throwing British or French
troops into Rabegh, but it is clearly desirable that such action should be
delayed as long as possible. This might make us too late, hence the
r.