مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [ظ‎‎٢‎٥‎٢] (٦٤٤/٥٠٤)

entertains lor economic development a feverish passion which in many cases is
heightened by a personal financial interest. The country is manufacturing some
goods of quite passable quality, but there are too many silos with no grain in
them, too many sugar factories with too little to do; and no one knows whether
the ambitious blast furnaces which are being erected near Kerej will cv^r do any
serious work. There are less obvious marks of the regime in the general poverty
and the increasing corruption of officials of all classes. The bread shortage and
the adulteration of flour in various parts of the country, even in Tehran, have
caused considerable discontent. The Government’s remedy for discontent is a
vigilant police, a controlled press and now a controlled wireless broadcasting
service. Tehran radio was opened in April. It is intended to have eventually
twelve relaying stations, so that the whole country may be covered; the next step
will surely be to prevent listeners from owning sets which can receive foreign
broadcasts. The leaders of official society have to assemble every Thursday for
several hours to listen to propaganda talks and plays. Another step in the
elimination of all influences other than those of the State was accomplished by
the compulsory transfer of the American and British schools to the Iranian
Government. Negotiations for the transfer of the only remaining foreign schools,
viz., the French, were proceeding at the end of the year.
5. On the 29th June the Shah made a speech to the Deputies and directors of
the press, which at first seemed to be important. He blamed his Ministers, par
ticularly the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, who had recently
“ resigned,” for not keeping him informed, and said it was the duty of Ministers
to make the country realise the situation and prepare it for hard times; this they
had failed to do, with the result that in the prevailing confusion Iran’s proper
rights were being injured. He appealed to the new Prime Minister and to the
Majlis to remedy this, and especially to the press; naturally the press must not
argue about belligerent countries, but it must write careful articles to guide public
opinion. It is believed that, in the secret meeting which followed, the Shah said
something about the foreign situation, but that was never confirmed. The public
utterance was at first taken to be important, but if it was true (as it doubtless
was) that the Shah had been kept in the dark, that was largely because of the
terror which his furious temper and resentment of criticism inspired in his
advisers, while to accuse the controlled press of not enlightening the public was a
foolish injustice. The only result of this outburst was that for a short time the
newspapers produced inspired articles on foreign policy, but these became more
and more anodyne, until the press became as submissively dull as before.
6. The Shah has steadily pursued two intentions—to remain neutral, and
to carry out his plan of economic development with as little interruption as pos
sible. It was undoubtedly the Shah’s views which were expressed by the Crown
Prince when he received His Majesty’s Minister in January; His Imperial High
ness did not hide his opinion that the war was a nuisance to Iran : “ only Danzig ”
stood between the world and peace; it was a pity that Germany had been “ thrown
into the arms of Russia.” It is natural that Iran sliould regret the ending of
that pre-war situation so advantageous for herself, when the increasing power
of Germany tended to counterbalance that of the two Powers she regards as her
ancient enemies, Russia and Great Britain, and when the German economic
system fitted so neatly in to that of Iran. When the war began it is probable
that the feeling of the Iranian Government {i.e., chiefly the Shah) was mainly
one of fear lest the weakening of Germany should leave Russia free to pursue
her ancient designs upon Iran, but various events, such as the German attitude
towards the Russo-Finnish war and the sinister Molotov-Hitler talks in Berlin,
made the Iranian Government incline eventually to the view that Iran would count
little in German eyes if it was a question of a bargain with Russia. Although
there were signs that official circles on the whole hoped for and expected a German
victory, until doubt was thrown on that possibility in the autumn, it could not be
fairly said that they showed active pro-German feelings as a whole, though
occasional protests had to be made because it seemed to His Majesty’s Legation
that the controlled press favoured Axis rather than Allied news items. There was,
it is true, a pro-German current in the Ministry of Finance, a current probably
due in the main to corruption; but, since the Ministry of Finance has to satisfv
the Shah by selling Iranian produce and securing essential goods, it is not surpris
ing that its officials should incline towards the Power which it finds most useful
in this respect, Germany at first lost her position as Iran’s most considerable