مجموعة ٥٩/٣٠ "الخليج الفارسي. تأسيس البحرية الفارسية، إلخ" [و‎‎٣‎٠‎٧] (٦٢٤/٦١٤)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty ’s Government.]
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 4421/1016/34
P
6152
i 1929
No. 1.
September 3, 1929.
r
Section 2.
Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3).
(No. 440. Very Confidential.)
Sir, Tehran, August 21, 1929.
WITH reference to paragraphs 17 and 18 of my despatch No. 439 of the
21st August, I have the honour to record my conversation with the Minister of Court
on the subject of his proposal that His Majesty’s Government should, as one of the
conditions of Persia renouncing her claim to Bahrein, provide the Persian Government
gratis with a number of small vessels (four of 1,000 tons and six of 200) in order to
police her waters and deal with the contraband traffic.
2. I said that if, for the sake of argument, His Majesty’s Government were
prepared to present Persia with ten vessels such as he proposed, how did the Persian
Government propose to man these vessels ? So far as I was aware, not only could
they not provide officers but they could not provide crews. While I did not profess
to know anything about naval matters, I imagined that before a British officer was
put in command of a gunboat of 1,000 tons he would have had to have some ten years’
service ; this added to five years’ training at a naval college would make fifteen years.
Again, I asked what about the Italian gunboats which I understood had been ordered
and the contracts which had been made with Italian naval officers ? His Highness said
that the Italian gunboats had not yet been definitely ordered, and that there would be
no difficulty about the Italian naval officers. Speaking personally [i.e., he had not
submitted this to His Majesty or to the Council of Ministers), what he would like
would be for British officers to command these vessels and for His Majesty’s
Government to agree to train in England a number of young Persians so that in time
they might be competent to take them over. I showed no enthusiasm for this
proposal; instead, I pointed out some of the difficulties in the way. I said, for
instance, that, so far as I understood, no British officers and no British crews were
kept in a bad climate like the Persian Gulf for more than two years. The Persian
Gulf was notoriously one of the worst climates in the world. Supposing, however,
that British officers were allowed to volunteer for service in the Persian Gulf, they
would almost certainly not be prepared to stay for more than two years and would
quite certainly require a very much higher rate of pay than they would receive in the
British navy. I added that I felt very doubtful whether any Persian could ever be
trained as a naval officer. Practically the only Persians who had ever seen the sea
or knew anything about it were the Persianised Arabs who lived on the Persian shore
of the Gulf. It was no doubt possible that crews might eventually be trained from
this element, but I could not see where the officers were to come from. It was
notorious that Persians from the plateau when sent for service to Khuzistan or Persian
Gulf ports at once complained of the damp heat and only counted the days until they
could be relieved.
3. His Highness did not deny this, but said that about twenty young Persians
were at present being trained at the Italian naval school at Leghorn. He refused to
take such a pessimistic view of the possibility of eventually creating a small Persian
marine service.
4. To return, however, to the question of British officers, he was convinced that
Great Britain alone, with her outstanding knowledge of the Persian Gulf and the
finest navy in the world, could help Persia in her difficulties in putting down the
contraband trade.
5. He was prepared to recognise that Great Britain must always be the first
Power in the Persian Gulf. Persia was content with second place, but she wished
and intended to establish her right to that second place and to have her territorial
waters respected. Persia fully recognised all that Great Britain had done in the Gulf,
and that without our controlling hand Muscat, Koweit, &c., would be infesting the
Gulf with pirates, and that the traffic in arms and slaves would be general. He did
not for a moment wish to contest our claim to control the southern shores of the Gulf.
[911 c—2]