ملف ١١٨٧/ ١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "بلاد فارس - السياسة. المصالح البريطانية في الجنوب. السياسة الروسية" [و‎‎٢‎١‎٤] (٣٠٠/١٧٥)

Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Gover^^e^t.]
PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.
^September 8
[47400]
CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 1.
a copy of a financial statement laid before the Cabinet by the Treasurer-General, in
which a suggestion was made that a solution of the present financial embarrassments
might be found in the sale of certain territories to Great Britain and Russia
respectively.
I was surprised, in the course of a long conversation which I had on the
2(ith ultimo with the Prime Minister, to see that the suggestion put forward by
M. Mornard has had a favourable reception in Ministerial circles. Ala-us-Sultaneh
explained that people are in despair, and are so heartily sick of the situation that has
been created by Russia’s steady encroachments upon Persia’s prerogatives that they
are prepared to jump at any solution, however heroic, that might offer a chance of
reaching a clear understanding. His Highness said that the manner in which Russia
has laid hands upon the collection of revenue in the north from her subjects and
protected persons, who are becoming countless, and is insidiously taking possession of
the administration of the country through her consuls, has become so intolerable that
he believes that a Medjliss would welcome even such a drastic solution as a sale of
territory, provided that such conditions were attached to such a sale as would safeguard
Persia from a continuance of Russian intervention in her internal affairs, and would
guarantee her liberty of action in her own house.
1 would respectfully venture to submit that the scheme appears to me to offer a
possible solution of the Persian question, which, without some such radical step which
will clearly define the true position and intentions of all parties, seems to me destined,
sooner or later, to lead to serious differences between the British and Russian Govern
ments. It may injustice be said that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in so far
as it concerned Persia, has done a great work. It lias undoubtedly preserved Persia
from total disruption, but it has done its work, and if persevered in, will eventually j
prove a failure. If it be granted that both Governments were genuinely imbued with a 1
desire to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia at the time of the signature
of the convention, it cannot, I think, be gainsaid that circumstances have caused Russia
to in a measure, at least, overlook the underlying principle of the convention, and that
the recent action of the Russian legation and consuls has been of a nature to endanger
the continued existence of Persia as a sovereign independent kingdom.
As co-signatory of the convention of ]907, Great Britain would appear bound to
use her best endeavours to remind Russia of her undertaking under the said convention ;
but constant reminders of this nature are likely to produce friction, and it may, perhaps,
be rightly held that the protection of Persia’s rights under the joint guarantee of the
two Governments is not of sufficient importance to risk jeopardising the good relations
which it is of the first importance to maintain. There is, however, another side to the 1
picture which cannot be lost sight of: the steady encroachment of Russia by means of
the leasing of properties, and the intervention of Russian consuls which that entails, is
rapidly spreading southwards from Ispahan into the neutral zone, in which, under the
letter of the convention, Russia has equal rights with ourselves. It would appear to
me inevitable that some day —and that day is not far distant at the present rate of
progress—Russian interests will clash with old-established British rights in South
Persia, and a quarrel may ensue. Already, I understand, at Ispahan the British and
Russian residents pass each other as strangers.
Under such conditions, would it not, I venture to suggest, be well to take under
careful consideration the question whether or no the scheme of zones of influence has
been proved sufficiently successful to justify its continued maintenance ? It appears to
me to threaten to-day dangerous complications. Russia’s aspirations in the north have
been so far satisfied that either she or zealous consuls who are seeking their own self-
advancement are looking for fresh fields in which to make her influence felt. It is hard
O
[2251 h —9]
Opv to Endf'a
16 OCT 1914