"ملف ٧/٦ I مهبط الكويت" [و‎‎١‎٤] (٥٢٤/٣٢)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
SECRET.
NOTES BY THE AIR STAFF ON THE REGULATION OF AIR CONTROL
IN UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES.
THE use of Air Power as an instrument for the control of semi-civilized
countries is still a recent development, and it is important that all who are in one
way or another concerned with its regulation should fully understand the methods
by which it operates. The following notes describe the cardinal points of the
regulation of this form of control.
1. Moral effect of Air power.
It is a generally accepted axiom that the air arm achieves its chief results
through the moral effect it produces on the enemy, and when employed in backw ard
countries there is the favourable factor that the enemy has little or no air resources
with which to counter our action. This enhances the moral effect on the inhabitants,
who are confronted with a weapon against which they cannot retaliate.
2. Necessity for co-operation between the Air Force Commander and the local
Political Authorities.
The proper employment of air power is essentially dependent on the most
intimate co-operation between the Air Force Commander and the local political
authority. If air operations are to be successful, it is vital that all concerned with
their conduct, whether civilian administrators or officers of the fighting services,
should realise that success is dependent on the effect produced on the enemy mora e.
To obtain this moral effect, air forces do not require to get to grips with the enemy,
nor do they produce tangible and visible results, such as prisoners of war, casualties
to our own personnel and definite advances into the enemy s country. During active
air operations there are few of the recognised signs of warfare; there are no long
columns, no marching and counter-marching, no Red Cross ambulances, and none ol
the so-called panoply of war. Consequently, those who in the past h a ve only been
accustomed to fighting on the ground, where nothing can be achieved without gaining
actual physical contact with the enemy and defeating him in battle, are not always
able to appreciate the effect that air action produces on the enemy s morale and
mentality. In land warfare the progress of operations is slow, and it is possible to
estimate the result of a particular operation and to foresee the approaching end when
one combatant will surrender or ask for an armistice. The political authorities
been able to follow the course of the operations and are well aware when the final
scene is set and it is their turn to enter the arena and to conduct the peace negotia
tions. In air warfare it is not possible to follow the operations stage by stage, and
that is especially the case when the operations are carried out against a semi-ciyilised
enemy, and when it is consequently difficult to judge the moral effect of air action on
his mentality. In this tvne of warfare it is essential that the Air Officer Commanding
and the local political authority should act together and maintain the closest touch
so that the Commanding Officer, assisted by the advice of the political officer and
by his intimate knowledge of the characteristics of the enemy, can keep his hnger
on the pulse of the enemy morale and nerves and decide, subject to any overriding
political consideration, on the most favourable objectives for attack and can sa^
whether air action should be continued or suspended against former objectives, or
whether the bombing should be distributed over a wider area. Unless this close touch
is maintained, the Air Officer Commanding cannot advise when the right moment
has arrived for air operations to be temporarily suspended, and for the political
authority to endeavour to initiate peace negotiations.
The air arm is a delicate weapon which is easily blunted if misused, either by
wielding it too early or too late, and especiallv too much. How, where, when and in
what degree it is to be employed are questions upon which the Air Officer
Commanding on the spot, and he alone, can give authoritative advice with the aid
of the local political officer, and by using his experience in estimating the effect of the
air operations on the morale and mentality of those against whom the operations are
being conducted.
[ 19366 ]