"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎١‎٧‎٨] (٥٤٠/٣٦١)

300 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
were to continue to block the enemy’s retirement northwards.
The 17th Division was to continue the pursuit during the
night and to attack the enemy vigorously as early as possible in
the morning. General Sanders' column was to be prepared
to push on to the ferry north of Huwaish before daylight if
the situation demanded it, pushing on cavalry in the meantime
to watch the river as far as there during the night.* The
7th Cavalry Brigade was to press forward so as to co-operate
with the 11 th Cavalry Brigade and General Sanders' column
in cutting off the enemy’s retreat; and the 18th Division was
to hold the bridgehead on the Little Zab.
General Cobbe had come to the conclusion that the enemy
probably intended to hold the line south of Sharqat, which he
was entrenching, with about half his force and to make a
direct attack on the 11th Cavalry Brigade or else cross to the
Tigris left bank with the other half. His chances of effecting
the latter had been minimised by General Sanders’ rapid
advance, but this made it all the more necessary to divert
as many of the enemy as possible from an attack on the 11 th
Cavalry Brigade. As further reports reached him, General
Cobbe saw that the progress of the 17th Division had been
unexpectedly slow. Moreover, it was not clear that General
Leslie realised how imperative it was to press the pursuit.
Accordingly at 10 p.m. General Cobbe’s Chief of Staff telephoned
both to General Leslie and his senior General Staff Officer and
impressed on them the urgent necessity of more rapid progress
and of calling on their troops for further efforts despite
exhaustion.
At 11.20 p.m. General Leslie issued a fresh order directing
General Wauchope's column to advance at 3 a.m., with a view
to attacking the enemy south of Sharqat, and Colonel
Coningham’s column to advance from Balalij with the same
object. The artillery of both columns was to be well in action
by 8 a.m. supporting the attack, in which the 18th Divisional
artillery would co-operate from the Tigris left bank. The 51st
Infantry Brigade was to continue its march through Qalat-al-
Bint at 6 a.m. along the river road and be in reserve.
Until the situation towards Altun Kopri was clearer and more
definite information had been received in regard to the where
abouts of the Turkish 2nd and 5th Divisions, it seemed necessary
to keep troops on the Little Zab. But some reduction in
* Contact aeroplanes had kept General Oobbe acquainted during the day
with General Sanders’ progress, but he had not yet heard of the latter’s
decision to march all night.