"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎١‎٥‎٥] (٥٤٠/٣١٤)

TURKISH SITUATION
255
tried unsuccessfully to purchase the Caspian fleet so as to
gain a road to Turkestan. About a fortnight after he reached
Baku the first train-load of oil left Baku for Tiflis. But the
war news became worse daily and on the 2nd November he
and his party departed for Germany. He denies that it was
a mistaken dispersion of force to send German troops to the
Caucasus, as he considers that it was a necessary undertaking
to obtain oil and manganese, which were essential for carrying
on the war, while it also afforded a possibility of striking at
the British. As regards the Turks he said that Nuri Pasha
had very high-flown plans for consolidating his position in
Russian Azerbaijan and for advancing into Persia, where he
expected to organise a rising which would enable him to attack
the British in Mesopotamia from the east. Nuri’s position
in Baku was, however, precarious, as only the town area and
the railway connecting it with the west were in his hands. To
the south were hostile Armenians ; to the north the Daghestanis
were undecided in their attitude ; the anti-Turkish Bolsheviks
and other Russians were in Astrakhan and Northern Caucasia ;
and in Persia were the British.
At the end of September General Marshall received reports
that the 10th Caucasus Division had reached Damascus and
that another Turkish division had been withdrawn from their
Caucasus armies. A German cavalry brigade and seven
German infantry battalions were said to be still in Trans-
Caucasia.
On the 30th September General Gillman, Chief of the General
Staff in Mesopotamia, who had been visiting North Persia
and Tehran, accompanied Sir Percy Cox to an interview with
the Persian Premier, who was anxious—owing to the fall of
Baku, our retirement from Mianeh and the evident inefficiency
of the Persian Cossacks—lest the Turks should advance on
Tehran. He also feared treachery, owing to Turkish intrigues,
on the part of the Jangalis. General Gillman, was, however,
able to reassure him, both as to the competence of our troops
north of Zenj an to stop any further Turkish advance and also
as to our ability to maintain Persian security at Enzeli and on
the Caspian.
In Mesopotamia, during the period under review in this
chapter, there were no active operations of importance. But,
owing to the requirements of other theatres of war, there had
been considerable reductions in the British force, while other
changes had been made and were projected. Half a million
additional combatants were being recruited, trained and