"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎١‎٢‎٢] (٥٤٠/٢٤٨)

THE GENERAL SITUATION
193
On the 7th July General Marshall left Baghdad on leave to
India, the senior officer present (Major-General H. D. Fanshawe,
18th Division) officiating in his place.
On the 10th the Commander-in-Chief in India, referring to
General Marshall’s wire of the 6th, telegraphed to the War
Office that, as the original object of the railway extension to
I ikrit seemed to have lost much, if not all, of its force, it seemed
a waste of material and rolling stock, badly required elsewhere,
to continue with it.
The War Office telegraphed on the 12th a summary of the
latest available information relating to the various theatres in
which India was interested. In Palestine the Germans seemed
inclined to withdraw units and the Turco-German forces there
seemed unlikely to reach the figure previously estimated
(i.e., 85,000). It was, therefore, improbable that General
Allenby would require strengthening unless it was for offensive
operations in the winter ; and these would be contingent on the
autumn situation in Europe. In the meantime the Hejaz was
attracting considerable Turkish attention.
The situation in the Balkans had been favourably altered
by a recent change in the Bulgarian Government, and this must
cause Turkey uneasiness in the west at a time when she was
concentrating her whole effort in the east.
General Marshall’s position could be assailed by three routes,
i.e., Caucasus—Tabriz, Nisibin—Mosul and Euphrates. Unless
the enemy abandoned their Caucasus ambitions, which was
unlikely, they had no troops available for a threat on either
line. In fact, everything pointed to increasing discord between
Turks and Germans in the Caucasus and to efforts on both sides
to support their opposing policies by increasing troops in that
area. Moreover, the total Turkish mobile reserve did not
amount to more than three divisions or about 15,000 rifles.
Consequently any serious threat against General Marshall must
be by Germans and they were not in a position, until a decision
was obtained in Europe, to undertake serious offensive opera
tions in Mesopotamia or elsewhere out of Europe. It was,
therefore, considered that General Marshall could rely on
carrying out his policy without interruption by the enemy for
some time to come, but naturally hampered by contingent
problems of transport and space.
The situation in Afghanistan seemed to depend largely on the
Amir’s personal influence. The possibility of enemy agent
intrigues was of course always present, but the arrival of even
small batches of enemy troops on the Afghan border seemed
(19465) o