"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎٨‎٢] (٥٤٠/١٦٩)

130 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
24th Punjabis, 1 st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire LioM
Infantry and 6 th Jats (all 50th Brigade) in this order from the
nght; and they were to commence their advance on a frontage
of nine hundred yards at 5.30 p.m. The 2/5th and 2 / 6 th
Gurkhas (42nd Brigade) were to follow the Dorsets in supmrt
and the l/5th Gurkhas were kept by General Lucas as reserve
In the 50th Brigade the 97th Infantry were to support the
other three battalions. Three sections 256th Machine Gun
Company were disposed to cover the crossing of the deep
ravine by overhead fire ; Hogg’s Group was to co-operate
against the left of “ R ” trenches ; and the Reserve Groun
was to follow Lucas’ Group. ^
When the advance began, our supporting artillery opened
its barrage at a slow rate of fire for the first fifteen minutes
and then increased to an intense bombardment for fifteen
minutes. This fire was accurate and so effective that, under
its cover and that of our machine guns, our infantry were able
to advance practically without a check and with very few
casualties.* Some machine guns in “ Q” trenches gave the
left of our line a little trouble; but the commander of the
6 th Jats detached a company, which soon stormed the ridge
on which these machine guns were and captured four of them
with a battalion of the Turkish 169th Regiment (12 officers
and 250 rifles). The remainder of our infantry encountered
little opposition and overran “ R ” trenches, capturing four
guns and many prisoners.
As it grew dark our advanced infantry got somewhat
scattered m the broken ground and inter-communication
became difficult. At 8.20 p.m., therefore. General Andrew
issued orders for the troops to bivouac where they were; and
at 11.30 p.m., after visiting units, he issued orders for a further
advance at 5 a.m. next morning.
General Brooking with his headquarters had established
imself by 5.30 p.m. at a position (within two miles of Khan
i^aghdadi), from which he could see that the bombardment was
6 a ft er . sunse L the dust and growing darkness
^ temporary interruption of telephone communication
ma e it impossible for him to find out accurately what had
appened till about 9 p.m. Our own casualties had evidently
een light, air reports estimated that we had captured over
firp Ptww'* y o g , 0 l f0rward * nto Positions from which they could
the Slones iprp n ’ 800 ^ 2 ’ 200 yards ’ and . front of them farther* down
fire the rlnct ur . m ^ chl J le guns. In addition to the actual effect of this
infantry raised afforded a most efficient screen to our advancing