"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎٨‎٠] (٥٤٠/١٦٤)

ACTION OF KHAN BAGHDADI
125
that the operations would extend over a considerable area,
that the various groups, though scattered, were strong and
that our force was more mobile than the enemy’s. To enable
him to use his reserve to the best advantage, it was essential,
said General Brooking, that he should receive continual
situation reports ; and he emphasised the fact that success
would depend much on the individual action of group
commanders, for which the operations offered full scope.
At Hit the alluvial plain of Mesopotamia gives place to
a limestone and clay region, in which the Euphrates runs at a
considerably lower level than the surrounding country,
which consists for the most part of a barren undulating plateau
intersected by steep and rocky ravines. Our information
regarding the topography of the country between Sahiliya and
Ana was scanty ; and topographical reconnaissance had been
purposely restricted to avoid arousing the enemy’s suspicions*
But, from the information we possessed, the ground over
which the operations would be carried out appeared generally
practicable for all arms ; and it was consequently hoped that
the proposed action of the cavalry and armoured cars would
not be hindered by difficulties of ground.
General Andrew, starting as ordered, halted just before
1 a.m. on the 26th March at a point on the road about ten
miles from Sahiliya. He then sent forward one company from
each of three infantry battalions against the enemy’s “ P ”
trenches, to occupy them if unopposed or if resistance was
faint, but to withdraw if the Turks were present in strength.
The three companies, after advancing some distance, were
checked about 2 a.m. at close range from the trenches by gun,
machine gun and rifle fire.f The position was evidently held
in strength and the three companies withdrew. General
Andrew then moved his group to the west of the road under
cover in the low hills, to avoid the area on which Turkish guns
were probably registered and to await daylight.
At 3.15 a.m., General Brooking received the report that
the enemy’s “ P ” trenches were strongly held. As this news
indicated that the enemy had not retired. General Brooking
regarded it as satisfactory. By 4.30 a.m. he had established his
headquarters at a point west of the Aleppo road about six
miles north-west of Sahiliya, near the only suitable site for
the landing of aeroplanes.
* General Brooking considered that the British reconnoitring activity had
been mainly responsible for the enemy’s retirement from Hit.
| They suffered 43 casualties at this stage. Part of them actually entered
the trenches but were driven out again.