"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎٤‎٥] (٥٤٠/٩٥)

64 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
was also much dissatisfied. But, on this question also, Enver
Pasha did not come to any decision till the end of September
when he arrived at the following compromise. The forces
in Syria and Arabia* were to form the Fourth Army under
Diemal Pasha, with headquarters at Damascus , the forces in
Palestine, i.e.,’ up to the northern boundary of the Jerusalem
province and on the Jerusalem line of communication, were to
be formed into a new Eighth Army, which with the Sixth and
Seventh Armies were to come under F alkenhayn s command.
The enemy's main attention was thereafter concentrated on
operations on the Palestine front, and though preparations in
Mesopotamia continued they were only carried out in a luke
warm fashion. . ^ ,
On the 30th September Mustapha Kemal Pasha, commanding
the Turkish Seventh Army, sent a letter to Enver Pasha on the
general situation, which, being ill-received by Enver, led to
Mustapha Kemal's resignation a few days later. This letter is
given in full in Appendix XLII, but for easy reference its main
contentions are summarised here. Drawing attention to the
chaotic state of the country internally, due to the failure and
corruption of the civil administration, he said that if the war
continued Turkey’s greatest danger was probable internal
dissolution. It was likely that the war might continue for a
considerable time and the Central Powers did not hold the key
to peace, while the forces of Turkey were so weak that even if
all her resources were collected they would still be unsufficient.
Constantinople might be attacked from the west. On the
Caucasus front the Turks could make no headway, and could
not stop a Russian offensive if made, though such an offensive
seemed impossible. In Mesopotamia the British, having
gained their objective, had no political, economic or military
reasons for a further advance ; and even if they did continue
to advance successfully, the loss of Mosul would not be very
serious, and would not affect the general situation. On the
Hejaz and Sinai fronts the enemy had not yet attained his
political and military objectives, and was known to be preparing
to achieve his purpose, which was the subjection of Turkey,
the formation of a Christian state in Palestine under British
influence, the denuding of Turkey of her most prosperous
provinces and the destruction of her last religious predominance.
Thus the exigencies of the military situation required Turkey
to be ready to meet an attack from the west and to forestall
the enemy's advance on Syria. It was useless to ignore the
danger to Syria or to think of recapturing Baghdad— a
* i.e., Asir and Yemen.