"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎٢‎٩] (٥٤٠/٦٣)

34
HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
General Staff on this matter on the 2nd August giving his
views pending a reply from Baratoff, whom he had asked to
give certain details as to when he would reoccupy the Diyala
line and as to his supply and transport requirements. General
Maude still stipulated for a vigorous Russian offensive every
where and that his own advance should be conditional on the
Russian movements ; but he might possibly have to cut down
the number of his infantry divisions for the advance from
four to three. After going into some factors affecting the
maintenance question he said that he realised the governing
factor in the problem was what the Russians could do. The
advantages of a combined British and Russian offensive if it
could be arranged were manifest, for it would give us the
initiative, a valuable asset. The Turkish concentration seemed
to be behindhand so that, granted an early Allied move, there
was a good prospect of breaking up that concentration piece
meal; while the moral effect of our advance would be
substantial both in Mesopotamia and in neighbouring countries.
A passive attitude by us would allow the enemy to complete
his concentration and deliver his main stroke as he thought
fit; and though this attitude might be forced on us by Russian
inaction, we should not adopt it till it was clear that there was
no other alternative open to us. The fact of having unreliable
allies need not necessarily paralyse us in the pursuance of war.
Should a continued offensive by the whole Russian forces and
ourselves be decided on after the receipt of the Russian reply,
it must be carried out, said General Maude, on the principles
outlined previously with due caution and coinciding, step by
step, with Russian progress.
On the 5th August General Maude replied to the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff’s telegram of the 2nd regarding possible
developments in Mesopotamia. Assuming that rumours of
movements were accurate and that these had already begun,
he calculated that eleven Turkish divisions, numbering
approximately 67,000 rifles with 308 field and heavy guns*
could be concentrated south of Mosul by the end of September.
This number added to the Sixth Army troops in Mesopotamia
would give a total of 96,500 rifles and 452 field and heavy guns.
The Russian force on the Persian front, consisting of some
22,000 sabres, 31,000 rifles and 102 guns, was being held in
check by 10,000 Turks with 36 guns ; and as the latter seemed
unlikely to detach more than another 5,000 men with 48 guns
for this purpose, this would mean that they could bring
81,500 rifles and 370 guns against General Maude. The enemy
i.e., 24 field and 4 heavy guns per division.