[ملف غير مُرقّم] "يوميات زيارة العقيد هاميلتون إلى نجد ١٩١٨" [ظ‎‎٣‎٧] (٢٠٦/٧٤)

18
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Bin Sand is certain. Nor can lie be brought over to our side because it is
the fundamental policy of Hail and the Shammar to lean on the Turks so as to
remain independent of Najd.
15th Attended mejlis in Bin Sdud’s office. Sat next to
Faisal ibn Rashid, the fugitive; beyond
DayiigM-Toms.ior. him was Ibn Farun ( ^>1 ) [Abu
Hamdi ) as he is called ]; and his nephew, Musa ( ); another
nephew, Sabri ( ), is also in Riadh. Sabri has a fair beard and is very
German-looking. Ibn Farun is a small, fat man of about 40, with a limp.
Musa is tall and dark. Ibn Farun used to be a great friend of Bin Sand’s. The
latter now keeps him as a prisoner, but allows him some liberty. Many people
say that the old friendship between them still continues, sub rosa, and the
confinement of Ibn Farun is a mere pretence. The Amir was not keen on my
seeing him in my rooms. Had a long talk with ‘Abdullah al Hakim and
Ahmad ibn Thaniayan. At 2-30 p. m. went for a ride with Bin S£ud and most
of the As-Saud family, including half a dozen little boys. Bin Saud led a sort
of war-dance on horseback and, after galloping round for about half an hour,
we went and sat under a mud wall in the sun while the horses were off-
saddled and allowed to roll in the sand. Bin Saud fired 2 shots with a revolver
and 10 with a rifle without hitting the mark, except once. A stone was stuck
up at a distance of 150 yards. We then came back to the town in procession.
After dinner, at 8 p. m., went to the Amir as usual and heard a torrent of talk,
mostly against Salim (Shaikh of Kuwait), till 10-30 P. M., when we retired.
Bin Saud seems worried and never gets easily carried away by the exuberance
-Mejlis at
8-30 this morning.
Found the Amir alone.
of his word-flow.
16th November.-
Letters brought from Hasah; Bin Saud very depressed about Italian re verses;
description of situation by Reuter as capable of resulting in a Rumanian
debacle has given him a fright. Our success at Bir-Sheba did not make up for
it. After breakfast Ahmad ibn Thanaiyan came and discussed politics.
Went for gallop round Biadh—which is a small place—rode out to village of
Manfuhah—riverbed of Wadi Hanifah—is very rocky here. Returned to supper,
which I still continue to eat with my Bedouin companions. Must discuss camp
for mission. Riadh cannot be larger than Shagrah though they say that it is.
17th November. —Had a little fever last night; am sweating it out to-day,
^ ^ ptqo t> q 1 jr/v Went for a ride on camel at 1-45 (Arabic);
Early morning —Temp. 73°, Bar. 2,150. , v .j . <
* returned in time to attend meghs at
3-10 (Arabic). Met the Amir ; several other members of the As-Saud family
present, also Ibn Farun and his nephew, Musa, and Faisal ibn Rashid. After
breakfast came ‘ Abdullah al Hakim and endeavoured to persuade me to put my
ideas of what Bin Sdud should do on paper. I said that I must wait for the
arrival of these two officers from Hasah and see any instructions they might be
bringing with them, but that opr preliminary conversations had been of
great valup. I had quite a good general notion of what the Amir’s ideas were
and what he was able to attempt. The capture of Hail is the first, in fact, the
only, problem v e have at present to face. The fall of Hail would mean, in all
probability, the collapse of Madipah. Bin Sdud’s main idea is his position in
Central Arabia (now and after the war). The question now was a twofold
one:—“Was he to maintain his present attitude and carry out his part of the
bargain made at Kuwait in November 1916 {vide page 11 of precis regarding
the relations of the British Government with Bin Saud), i.e., maintain a force in
Qasim of 4,000 men to hold Ibn Rashid in check and attack him, if opportunity
occurred, or to take a more active line ? In either case his finances must be
bolstered up, but, in the latter case, he would require munitions and money
far in excess of his present allowances and on par with the subsidies granted
to the Sherif. In fact, we should regard and equip him as a British Division,
It is obvious that taking a more active part means attacking the Shammar
and endeavouring to capture Hail. It would be suicidal to make the attempt
without adequate means in money, supplies, armed forces, and war material
“ There cannot be ”, he went on saying, ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية the least doubt that but for his atti
tude and for his keeping in check not only his own tribes, but those of Ibn
Rashid alone made it possible for the Sherif to act with any freedom against
the Turks now ”.