مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٤‎٢‎٦] (٩٨٢/٨٥٧)

2
Enclosure in No. 1.
Record of a Conversation between Sir Humphry* and
VA o TN - vas h V who is Minister of Finance in the new Cabinet, asked if l
ould receive him on’the 22nd March, and we conversed for about two hours. 6
He said that he wished to dispel certain misapprehensions which had arisen
ve^ardimr the speeches which he had made m the Chamber of Deputies on the
.J! n. oFtcnbpH \ T nri Shaukat, the late Prime Minister, on the
iBth March when he attacked Nuri Shaukat
subject of the treaty. He said that he had been incorrectly reported m some ot
the Bagdad newspapers. It was true that he had criticised adversely the
Financial Agreement signed by Nuri Pasha and myself m London m August
U)30 which had been ratified with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. . This did
not mean however, that he had any intention of agitating for the revision of the
Financial Agreement, as he realised that his acceptance of office m the new
Government implied agreement with the policy of his colleagues. On my asking
what this policy was. he declined to define it m advance of the statement which
he said would be shortly made by the Prime Minister. He said that he quite
realised that the Treaty of 1930 and its annexures, after its ratification by the
Parliaments of our two countries, had become an international bond which must
be honourably observed by both parties, but he hoped that, if he remained m office,
he would have the opportunity later to approach me, directly 01 indirectly, with
a view to the revision of the stipulations in the agreement which concerned the
Iraq railways in particular. He admitted that the present arrangement could
not be altered except by mutual consent, but he hoped that my Government would
show generosity in a matter on which Iraqis of all shades of opinion held very
strong views.
I reminded him that the agreement on the subject of railways was based on
the recommendations of Sir Hilton Young, who was one of the foremost experts
of our time and had visited Iraq twice during recent years for the purpose of
giving advice on financial questions. The scheme which had been laid down in
that agreement involved the creation of a statutory board, whose operations would
be subject to the provisions of a Railway Corporation Law. which was was to be
passed by agreement between our two Giovernments. Until that law was passed
and the scheme recommended by Sir Hilton Young had been tried, it was clearly
unreasonable to discuss any other arrangement. If, however, the scheme failed
after being given a fair trial, it would be incumbent on our two Governments to
devise something else. I assured him that it was the genuine desire of my
Government to hand over eventually to the Iraq Government an efficient railway
system, which was not over capitalised and which they could run for themselves
with a minimum of foreign assistance as soon as Iraqis had been trained for the
purpose. I felt sure that he would admit that the interests of his country
demanded that the management of the railways should be in experienced hands
throughout.
We next discussed briefly the Port of Basra, in regard to the management of
which Yasin Pasha had no serious objections to urge.
I then asked him whether he had really said in Parliament that the existence
of Royal Air Force units in Iraq was inconsistent with the country's indepen
dence. 1 asin replied somewhat evasively that he had always held the view that
the Treaty of 1930 did not confer complete independence on Iraq. He would not
urge that complete independence was possible or even beneficial in the present
circumstances, but it annoyed him to hear Iraqi statesmen—such as the late Prime
Minister—affirm in public that Iraq was now completely independent. After I
had explained to him, on the lines of my evidence before the Permanent Mandates
(commission at Geneva, the reasons why the location of Royal Air Force units in
Iraq was necessary in order to make possible the discharge of Great Britain's
obligations under the alliance, I asked him straight out whether he preferred a
treaty of alliance with us or an ordinary treaty of friendship. Yasin stated
emphatically that a treaty of alliance was necessary for Iraq until she was
strong enough to defend herself without foreign assistance. It would take many
} ears tor her to bring her army up to the required standard and, in the meantime,
•a oiW P n efer ^ alliance with Gr eat Britain to one with any other Power. He
sen at Gieat Britain s record in Iraq had been immeasurably more generous
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