مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٣] (٩٨٢/٥٩٠)

3
crush him, and feel that after his success in overthrowing two Cabinets he will
' become an intolerably insolent neighbour. They also anticipate that he will in
siMjii future, dominate the Government officials in the liwa and that, in consequence
there will be small chance of their being given a square deal in the land, water and
Mil other disputes which are the mam interests of tribal life in this part of the
tiieir Ik country.
ckrifi 17. Nevertheless, as the anti-Abdul Wahid groups constitute the better- 1
behaved and more law-abiding elements in the province, the Government will, in
matiofs all probability, win them over in the end by smooth talk and fair promises’ to
which end the mutessarif has already set out to visit them. With Abdul Wahid
Kin Mi a settlement is likely to be sought by giving him substantial satisfaction,
while at the same time making provision to save the face of Government.
18. If events shape in this way, all may be well for a while, but I am advised
that, in the long run, the elementary fact that a comparatively small tribal
combination has successfully overthrown two Cabinets and brought about the
dissolution of Parliament (if this occurs) will gravely impair the authority of the
Government as a ruling institution, and that in the next few years serious
v|' consequences may ensue. Certainly, judged by all the accepted canons of good
a™ government, this appreciation seems justified. On the other hand, it is evident
RaiiiM that if, in the prevailing circumstances, Jamil Beg A1 Madfai’s Cabinet had
attempted to impose their authority on the Middle Euphrates by force, they would
nance, # have run a very serious risk of disastrous failure, the consequences of which might
i andli well have been immediate and overwhelming. While I hesitate to form a positive
prepaid| opinion on this complex situation so soon after my first contact with the men and
0 f affairs of this country, it appears to me that the King has probably chosen the j
ia ’ s palittj less dangerous of the two admittedly exceedingly hazardous and unsatisfactory *
Rauffi{| alternatives which were open to him. If time can be gained by the early
liquidation of the present situation, it may be possible to devise palliatives for
the evils which may arise in the future.
19. From all the reports I have seen since my arrival, it appears clear that
there is nothing anti-foreign in the unrest on the Middle Euphrates. There is, j
however, a distinct danger that the source of its inspiration may shift from /
Bagdad to Najaf and Kerbala, in which case the struggle would probably cease to
he one between the Government and certain tribes, or even between uue tribal j
group and another, and would become a religious war between Sunni and Shiah. .
on T tUic rlpsrmteh to His Maiestv S Ministers at I
Jo0
20. I am send
Tehran and Jedda.
I have, &c.
ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.