مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٢‎٣‎٥] (٩٨٢/٤٧٥)

right their wrongs. By such means as these the Bagdad cabal, working
the control of Yasin Pasha, set in motion, for the first time in the hi t Under
Iraq, what must be called a strong and representative popular movement 8 • °i
the Government in power. a ^ ainst
6. The measure of the success which was achieved has been de K
elsewhere. While a hostile Senate blocked necessary legislation thp
sheikh of the Euphrates, Abdul Wahid, brought his tribesmen out and f;
the Government officials of Abu Sukhair to their offices. In other re’ 6 ^
although there were no open demonstrations, tribal sympathy was almost
with the opponents of Ali Jaudat, and there is reason to believe that a° H
diversions had been promised in the event of the Government’s attenmt'
assert their authority on the Euphrates by force. The only element which ralhll
to the support of the Wihdah party was the group of sheikhs who for tr hsl
reasons, were habitually antagonistic to Abdul Wahid. These proclaimed th &
loyalty and offered to fight their tribal rivals. Their weight was however Z
enough to restore the balance. Two Wihdah Cabinets fell in quick
and Yasin and his friends came into power. 4 successi ^,
7. His end achieved, Yasin Pasha found himself in a position that was hv
no means easy. He had provoked something like a revolution. He had set
motion forces which he might well be unable to control, for he had let the tribes
see their real strength. His Government were now confronted with the task of
implementing the promises made to their supporters. They set about coaximr
the Kurds into patience. To would-be Deputies they gave fresh hope by the
dissolution of Parliament, while the extreme Nationalists were quietened bv thp
sight of Yasin Pasha once more at the head of affairs. With the Shiahs it was
more difficult to settle accounts. The Ulema of Neiaf and Kerbela seized tho
opportunity to draw up a list of demands which went further than the Govern
ment wished to travel along the path to fuller Shiah participation in public life
I hen* claims were rendered more formidable by the support which they won from
tnbes hostile to Abdul Wahid. This combination was the most difficult of the
new Administration s immediate problems, for it had hitherto respected the
authonty of government and had moved along constitutional lines P But the
Government also had to settle with Abdul Wahid, who clearly expected a
handsome reward for the decisive part he had played in the overthrow of Ali
th?nrL * S ° me TT k u he pra A nce f about Ba gdad, where he was acclaimed by
the press as a great leader. At the same time representatives of the tribes
effoiTs 6 of t0 fh h eTnh ere f a S ° pr ^ sent ^ the capital, hostile and suspicious. The
eiloits or the Cabinet were directed towards winning the confidence of these
n™ fP g Abdul Wahid. As tfeir instruments foriS
andTusterl hvnGt P kinahan Cornwallis, who were known to
nrevair Snrh A 11 ? 86 tnbes - F ° r a tlme Iooke d as if this influence would
ffT L] rtf ri W ° U d U.t mean , t the avoid ance of bloodshed, and would have
Mfoister Chose rt?f a aDd A helr d ans inno “- But unhappily the Prime
Nuri Pasha dhhot 1 ” 0 " 1611 ° °f St Sl 1 r Kinahan Cornwallis aside and, left alone,
assurances for ,,, 1 , i| ll ,V Vl ' e y u f tc ! tke task - Although the sheikhs received the
that the C ovp *n ’ C t ba ' . asked . they seem to have remained unconvinced
administratfor Tht fi T* ■ bent u P on the improvement of the
01 “ ,,ir **• h "' i - ,k
built* ThoTudlviinff 6 ^’ U P°i n wbacb an y r yal hopes of progress may be
for honestv of rm rr>n 1Ilem:iers present Cabinet have no higher reputation
have been iust ms n ?nnA f 1 inte » r ^y tban their predecessors, and in the past they
thev have come iutn nffi -° ^ pu ^ lc office for private gain. The tactics by which
most influential el pm Ant- 6 ^ 10w ® ver ’ m ade it clear to a large portion of the
institution are uo? ^ P e ° ple , ° f 1 the countl T tba t the Government, as an
organised and exnrp^Arl ip ° ent ’ anc ^ tbat popular opinion, however crudely
inconsequence find that Zh n ° W a power;ful influence. The Cabinet will
regardless of oublic iutArA«t ^ govern in the old irresponsible manner,
therefore tLTYZZZZZ! ^ ° f p0pular feelin g- ^ may be hoped,
restored tranquillity tUGret dutv fo WlU reallSe -hf’ after havin S
necessarv to rai qa tUA cto a a 1S . to study most carefully the measures
ISYresfC’thmv^ re A ad ®wistration in all parts of the country.
fpart from a flirts Hon AT “ T" ° f tbe Cabi net’ S intention in this regard,
apart trom a flirtation wrth a plan to strengthen the British element in the