مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎١] (٩٨٢/٣٢٧)

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of Iraq. I asked him to tell me frankly what the facts were and what he felt
about the position of his Cabinet and about the situation in general in the
interior of the country. He began by saying that on the w hole he w^as by no
means dissatisfied. The position of the Government was strong and well
supported in a Parliament which could fairly be called representatives. When
they had come into office they had found that the authority of Government in the
provinces had fallen into contempt. (I need not say tnat he made no mention
here of the share he had had in bringing about this unhappy state of things.) As
I had seen, they had successfully re-established their prestige. In doing so they
had had to be severe, but their severity had been softened by a wide amnesty
and they were now doing their best to redress all genuine grievances. He could
not say "that they had made no mistakes. For instance, the recent executions in
the Sin jar had probably been hasty and ill-considered, but he was taking steps
to see that such things would not happen again. He hoped and thought that the
country realised that the Government meant to assert their authority and that
they would now be left in peace and quiet to carry out their programme of
reforms. In order to be able effectively to do this the Government needed a
long life and he did not know whether they could rely upon that. As I was well
aware much depended upon whether he and Nuri continued to work together.
Frankly, he was not sure whether he could still count upon Nuri. If I had heard
that there was any palpable dissension between them that was an exaggeration.
There had, indeed, been some slight differences on points of policy, but these had
been disposed of and I need not fear that any move to get rid of Nuri would
come from him, for without Nuri he clearly could not stand. So far as he knew
Nuri had been loyal to him, but he felt that he was now drifting away from him
and towards old associations and this was causing him anxiety. It would be
a help to him if I would speak to Nuri in the same sense as I had spoken to him,
and try to dismiss from Nuri's mind any impression he might have that the
Prime Minister was in any way dissatisfied with his Minister for Foreign Affairs.
7. I said that it seemed to me that such things as this should rather be the
subject of a frank and free talk between Nuri and himself, but I gathered from
the nature of his reply, which was, I am bound to say, confused, that in Iraq
it was difficult, if not impossible, for such relationships to be freely discussed
between a Prime Minister and a member of his Cabinet, and in the circumstances
I thought it best to undertake to speak to Nuri. Some days later an occasion
offered itself for a private conversation which ranged over all the ground I had
covered with Yassin. I found Nuri disposed to talk quite frankly. He said
that he had the impression that Y assin believed that he (Nuri) wanted to be
Prime Minister. That was quite wrong. He had had enough of being Prime
Minister. He was content with the Ministry for Foreign ‘ Affairs, where he
knew that he could do his best work. Y assin, on the other hand, was useless
and even truculent in any subordinate post. He had to be at the head of the
Government or in opposition, and in opposition he was damaging to the best
interests of the country. Yassin believed that all men were like himself—eager
to be at the top—and most of all he believed this of Nuri. There would be much
o e gained if I could rid Yassin of this belief. At present Yassin was the
only man m Iraq who was fit to be Prime Minister and I could tell him that
Aun had given me his personal guarantee that he would be loyal to Yassin. As
o e new ac ivities of the Wihdah-al- Wataniyah, Yassin need have no anxiety.
;; e (; i uri ) had ^hmg to do with them. It was true that Jamil Madfai had
hwilf ?ri Che f i ln ! Wlth an offer of support and had asked him to put
v • , a A , e . ead tins party, but he had replied that he was a member of
S A dmiIlls ^ atl - and was g° in g to be loyal to it. Jamil Madfai had
been much annoyed with him.
Nuri went on to say that I must not assume from what he had told me
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of count W. Far from it. The
but Stei fh ' 1 the ^"of the Interior liked to claim that all was well,
no ? t been obhged to have recourse four times to martial law in nine
4 notfipr inv-nvt f 18 ^ 10wed . that the country was in a grave state of discontent.
connfvUpH f 60 lon, 1 winch might at any time break out over some small incident
® xai 2 ,P le ’ Wlth the application of conscription, might well destroy
first wL ffip ^ T ^ e f main difficulties in the present situation. The
7 th i? ^ lmster ^e Interior and the second was the
p influence, which, m the past, had been so useful in keeping the
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