مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٣‎٠] (٩٨٢/٦٤)

He has certainly started well enough, and he has been acclaimed by the fickle Iraqi
people with what has the air of being spontaneous enthusiasm. Such as is known
of his programme has won wide popular support. It is a beautiful Utopia. But
some of its features are so rich in promise of antagonism from vested interests
that the very programme itself might well be the undoing of Hikmat.
11. So far as we are concerned, his attitude has been more than correct. He
has gone out of his way to give satisfaction and to declare his friendship. He has
accepted and acted upon every suggestion I have made to him. He has assured
me that he will honour the treaty of 1930, the railway convention and all other
agreements concluded between His Majesty’s Government and Iraq. And this
is not ungratifying from one who, in the past, has been the harshest critic of all
these instruments. But his obvious eagerness to please may be no more than a
sign of weakness. I cannot say as yet. In any case, as I believe that in him lies
our only present hope of escaping a military dictatorship, I think that, so long
as he pursues his policy as declared to me, he should have our support.
12. These reflections upon the present position of the new Prime Minister
lead me to examine the causes which have combined to bring him into partnership
with a man like Bekr Sidqi. His last effective appearance in politics was in the
company of Yasin and Rashid Ali, when Ali Jawdat was overthrown in 1935.
Why should he have turned against them? The answer to this question may
perhaps be found in the difference between his outlook on life and that of the
leaders of the late Government. Hikmat Sulaiman has shown no desire to enrich
himself. His agnosticism, his indifference to pan-Arab ideals, his contempt for
nepotism are all in sharp contrast to the fanaticism, the narrow nationalist views
and the acquisitiveness of Yasin and Rashid Ali. So soon as the common cause
which had united him and them had been crowned with success, these essential
differences of character quickly brought the three of them into conflict and drove
Hikmat Sulaiman out into a cold aloofness. Of late, however, ^ his growing
irritation against the Government had become more and more marked. He had
begun to gather about him a number of men, including Jafar-abu-Timman, who
shared his disliking for the constant use of martial law, the abuses in the
distribution of State lands, the provocative display of wealth, in the shape of
houses and motor cars, by high Government servants and so on. All those to whom
fortune had denied such blessings as these were ready to rally round him, but
their awe of the Government kept them dumb.
13. It is to be assumed that it was at this stage that he took the course of
turning for help to Bekr Sidqi, who, either because he shared these views, or more
probably because he saw a chance of gratifying his personal ambitions, threw in
his lot with Hikmat Sulaiman. It was a dangerous course, but it is to be presumed
that a man like the new Prime Minister did not take it without forethought.
14. While I hope that what I have written above, speculative though it be,
may serve to present to you an outline both of the causes of the recent upheaval
and of what it may lead to, I feel that it would be wrong to end on too pessimistic
a note. If the new Government are lucky, they may succeed in serving Iraq well.
If they are not, the generals may take over. But even that may not prove to be
so disastrous as we, with our inborn dislike of militarism, naturally fear.
15. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty’s High
Commissioner at Jerusalem and to His Majesty’s Minister at Tehran.
I have, &c.
ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.