مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [ظ‎‎٢‎٩] (٩٨٢/٦٣)

. i fWfore that there should be much speculation
5. It is not unnatural, thejetore tna under the control of Bekr Sidqi,
whether the army will now becom.^^P friends of j a f ar an d Taha, or whether
by the submission and emopeia _ courage to resist him. Whichever
these officers will have the stre g " . ai SQU i e ting, for resistance might well
choice they make, the situation m pro p a bly mean their gradual elimination
mean civil war and submission Wion from which he could make his
saa.ca.wsa w r ^ ■»«»*>
dangers ^°^g 1 f 1 ' a ™ kr gid ; has WO n over to himself the Iraq! air force.
But withlrhe ha take,! into his arms one who is, m the ^ew of those who clmm
to know the very man who, in his turn, will overthrow Bekr bidqi himselt. I
refer lo”Mohamed Ali Jawad (the dropper of the bombs) now Director of the
Air ForcT He is said to be still more ambitious than and probably as ruthless
and unscrupulous as his new chief. This is, therefore, a union which seems to
have the elements of much trouble while it holds together, and still more when it
breaks up.^ ^ ^ ^ ^ thege men have exposed themselves to the revenge
of those whom they have chased from office and from Iraq. With the senaeiess
murder of Jafar as a precedent, it is not hard to guess the form that this revenge
might take. Nuri left Bagdad breathing hate and vendetta against Bekir Sidqi
and Mohamed Ali, and Nuri is not a man to forget or forgive. I have no reason
to believe that Yasin’s sentiments were any milder, while the means at the disposal
of Rashid Ali, if he cared to use them, would be more than enough for any purpose
of this sort that he might have in mind. This would be enough to explain the
alleged eagerness of Bekr Sidqi’s young officers to dispose once ana for all of these
three men. It would also explain why to-day the possibility of the sudden
disapDearance of Bekr Sidqi is discussed as something quite natural. The murder
of Jafar may, indeed, be found to have set a fashion which may bring with it much
trouble for the future of Iraq.
8 . Above all this Hikmat Sulaiman seems to sail with a composure and a
determination v/hich are impressive. Elsewhere I have reported to you that he
has told me that at all costs he will oblige the army to resume its normal and
appropriate place in the polity of the country, and that he himself will not submit
to any form of domination by Bekr Sidqi. This was the main burden of a
two hours’ talk which I had with him when he came to the Embassy yesterday.
In reply to the sustained doubts which I expressed, he begged me earnestly to
believe that this was his unshakable resolve, and he said that by the end of the
present week I should see the first effects of his efforts. What I shall watch for
keenly is the return to their units of the component parts of the “ Forces of
Reform.”
9. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Prime Minister or, indeed,
his fixity of purpose, but I am by no means convinced that he will be successful.
All that I have heard of Bekr Sidqi leads me to think that it might need a tougher
man than Hikmat Sulaiman to put him down. At the same time I am advised
that he could not have ventured upon his march on Bagdad with any hope of
success unless he had been sure of the support of such men as Hikmat Sulaiman
and Jafar-abu-l imman, who could carry with them a large volume of public
opinion. But I coniess that I do not at present think that much comfort may be
drav/n from this. Bekr Sidqi may well have seen in co-operation with these two
good men a passing means of advancing his own career, which, broadly speaking,
began with the grizzly triumph of Simel, moved on to still further bloodv glories
on the Euphrates and has now come to its present dazzling success. If he escapes
the vengeance of the many powerful enemies he has made for himself and is given
tme to consolidate his position, the way to supreme power lies open to him ° We
still have to learn that he is not the man to take it—the final step. All this is
probably to put things at their worst, but it suggests possibilities not so remote
that we can afford to set them aside.
10. Now, perhaps, the time has come to look about for some encouraging
features m the situation. They are, I am bound to sav, slender, and for them
nt t m « S a tmn iu the u eW 1 nme Master. If there is value in the claim that
hone I ill I 1 ' A'i. 'tfl 1 ’ 5 ' Vv^r 10 ; 1 T thout Clvilian support, there may be some
hope that, befoie Beki Sidqi has had time to consolidate his position Hikmat
Sulaiman may be able to gather strength enough to make his own predominant.