مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [و‎‎١‎١‎٤] (٧٦١/٢٢٧)

117
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 2313/177/25]
Copy No.
Viscount Hatifoujc to Sir R. Bullard (Jedda).
(No. 86.) v '
rrxjT . . . . Foreign Office, March 29, 1939.
1HE Amir Faisal came to see me on the 24th March in order to say good-bye
befoie leaving London on the conclusion of the conferences on Palestine. His
Royal Highness was accompanied by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and by Fuad Bey
Hamza, who interpreted.
2. His Royal Highness said that he had received from the Prime Minister
the day before a letter which Mr. Chamberlain had asked him to convey to King
Abdul Aziz in reply to the letter which he had brought to Mr. Chamberlain from
his father on his arrival in this country. The Prime Minister had suggested
that, if there were any points in this letter which he desired to discuss before
his departure, he should do so when he saw me to-day. He was most grateful
for the full reply which had been given to his father’s enquiries, and for the
frank and friendly tone of the letter as a whole. There were, however, certain
points in the letter which were not entirely clear, and he wondered whether there
were any additional explanations which I would care to give him.
3. I told His Royal Highness that I was glad of this opportunity to make
certain comments upon the letter, as it dealt with one point of fundamental
importance about which I would like to say something. This point was the
possibility of aggression against Saudi Arabia. King Abdul Aziz had asked,
if I remembered rightly, what would be the attitude of this country were Saudi’
Arabia to be the victim of aggression. The meaning of the Prime Minister’s
letter upon this point was, I hoped, entirely clear, but the language used was
official and diplomatic. I therefore wished to fill in the picture in language which
it w T ould be difficult to put on paper.
i. I then went on to say that I could not imagine circumstances ever arising
in which Saudi Arabia was the victim of aggression by a major Power without
(Heat Britain being at war; and if Great Britain were at war, those who were
atuacked by her enemies would be her friends, and she would, I was convinced,
shape her policy accordingly. Moreover, the facts of geography made it inevitable
that Great Britain, with her manifold responsibilities in India, Singapore,
Australia and New Zealand, should always regard the eastern coast of the Red
Sea as an area of vital consequence. I did not think, therefore, that King Abdul
Aziz need have any doubt but that, if the case arose, the interests of Saudi Arabia
would be found to be the interests of Great Britain. I was not trying to say
anything new which was not already said in the letter. I only wished to give
additional emphasis to certain points made in the letter.
5. The Amir Faisal said that King Abdul Aziz had never doubted the
objects of British policy or supposed that they had changed. But he had felt
that the times demanded that his relations with Great Britain should be set out
more clearly than might have been necessary hitherto. Since, therefore, the
opportunity had occurred he had thought it right to address this enquiry to His
Majesty's Government in accordance with the frankness which characterised all
his relations with Great Britain.
6. Both His Royal Highness and I had other appointments and the few
remaining minutes had to be devoted to Palestine. It must therefore be a matter
for speculation whether His Royal Highness would have asked for a guarantee
of a more formal and binding character had there been more time for discussion.
His Royal Highness did, however, ask Sir Lancelot Oliphant, whom he saw a
little later, how the mechanical side of the community of interests between Great
Britain and Saudi Arabia would work in a crisis : how soon, for instance, could
help from Great Britain reach Saudi Arabia and what form would it take ? His
Royal Highness was told that the difficulty of answering hypothetical questions
of this kind was as a rule insuperable. But the enquiry would nevertheless be
examined with a view to seeing whether there was any'answer which could be
sent through you to the Saudi Arabian Government.
I 555 ff—1]