خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٢] (٦٠٦/٤٨٣)

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'he War Office
MOST jEGR.ET
CIPHER TELEGRAM
To : C.-in-C., India.
C.-in-C., Mediterranean
O'-.: 1 0150- 25/Y/41.
C.-in-C., Middle East.
C.-in-C., East Indies.
MOST IM/IEDIATS
80081 cipher (M.0.12) f-i, V
Following for C's-in-C. from Chiefs of Staff No. 150.
1. There is general agreement that the Gemans must be expelled from
IRAN as soon as possible. If this can be done by Anglo-Russian diplomatic
pressure, possibly backed by show of force, so much the better. If not,
it would be necessary to use force. With a view to forming an idea of the
implications involved in the latter course, we have prepared an outline plan,
and informed the Foreign Office that, subject to your general concurrence,
they may taice it that the requisite forces for taking a strong line in IRAN
are available.
2. Outline plan divided into two phases.
5. Phase 1 would, in our view, involve concentration of following
(a) Move to Iraq of some or all of the air forces earmarked by
Air Officer Ccoeanding-in-Chief, for operation "Raspbeny 1 '
up to four repeat four bomber squadrons to be prepared to
operate from Northern Iraq against military objectives in
Teheran. One repeat one fighter squadron to move into
Southern Iraq to be readily available for defence of
Iranian oil fields.
(b> Concentration of striking force on Iranian frontier in
Basra area. One repeat one Indian Infantry Division.
One rc 'cat one mechanised Cavalry Brigade. Two repeat
two Indian Armoured Regiments supported by one repeat
one Armg Co-operation Squadron. Object tc occupy
oilfields and refinciy at Abadan.
(c) Assembly of small Naval, and Army credit ion at head of
Persian Gulf consisting of three repeat throe or four
repeat four sloops end two repeat two companies Infantry.
Object to occupy Banda Shahpur and seize port and shipping.
should be glad of your comments and proposals as soon as possible.
Meanwhile, you are authorised to put in train, all preliminary arrangements
short of special troop movements®
forces
4
and consi
(i) Bombardment military objectives Teheran by R.A.F.
(ii) Advance of striking force into Southern Iran®
(iii) Arrival of expedition before Banda Shahpur.
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You arc not, of course, in ary • oy tied by the above plan, and we