"الملف ١/٨ الاتجار بالأسلحة" [و‎‎٢‎٤‎٨] (٦٢٤/٥٠٠)

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^ 01 '' he would sell it for about twice that amount. The fact was that Koweit had
ficult : become a recognised market where Arabs, whether would-be smugglers or not,
'ed went to purchase arms. He was quite prepared to believe that the British
' L d authorities in the Persian Gulf were right when they said that no arms entered
Koweit by sea, but it was absolutely certain that somehow or other these arms were
Available for sale in Koweit.
Mr. Boater said that His Majesty’s Government would certainly be prepared
to give the whole question their earnest attention if the Iraqi Government would,
in fact, be good enough to produce all the evidence in their possession.
At a later stage in the discussion, Major Edmonds suggested that His
Majesty’s Government might be prepared to consider a solution whereby substan
tial restrictions would be placed on the sale of arms in the Koweiti market. He
thought that in Muscat, before the war, His Majesty’s Government had insisted
that all the arms available for sale in that territory should be collected and stored
in one special warehouse under Government supervision, and that the sale of these
arms should be subjected to some form of Government control. He suggested that
some such system in Koweit might be the most effective method of dealing with
the situation which had arisen.
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Mr. Baxter said that this suggestion would receive further consideration.
As regards other forms of smuggling, Mr. Baxter wished to point out in the
first Diace that it was really entirely for the Government of a country to see that
smuggling into its territory did not take place. The Iraqi Foreign Minister had
nut forward three suggestions. The first was for a customs union between Iraq
and Koweit. This did not seem to His Majesty’s Government to be an acceptable
solution, since such an arrangement between a large State like Iraq and a sma
State like Koweit might be expected to undermine the independence of the smaller
State.
Taujiq Suwaidi said that he did not think that there was much foundation
for this fear. He said that for many years now the Iraqi authorities had ru
Koweiti postal administration. This had not he thought,
to the political position of the sheikhdom, and he did not see ^ ^
any difference if the Iraqi authorities also took over i m TnTu
administration Koweit would, of course, be offered a fixed annual sum i
aommistration. ivoweiu wul , , h f Koweitis themselves would
of its present customs revenue. He tnougnt tnat me
be very ready to accept such a suggestion.
Mr. Baxter said that the Iraqi Foreign Irive
the northern frontier line of Koweit should b y fi fd f urth e r south so as^g ^
the Iraqi preventive services more space m w ic * P t i |ft Cess j 0I1 t, 0 i ra q of
unacceptable. This suggestion would apparem y i compensation could
about one-third of Koweit, and it was difficult to see wnai r
be given to the sheikh elsewhere. .
Taufiq Suwaidi said that, if the ^f^essC/further to
Iraq and Koweit were found to be possible, it would not be neeessaiy
consider this alternative. . . , ,1 • j
Mr. Baxter proceeded that, as regards the Iraqi Foreign^ had
solution, he understood that the proposa o c ^ (| y j^ owe it had stated on
already been put forward some months ag . Iraqi Government when
that occasion that he was willing to nego ia p nt regarding the raising
he had reached an agreement with the ^ Satisfactorily
of their blockade. These negotiations had been proceeding ^
■^ e * , i , i j'pi what these negotiations
Taufiq Suwaidi interjected tha j ra q i n reply to the question
between Koweit and Saudi Arabia ha measures in mind in connexion
whether the Iraqi Government had P j^ owe it 5 Taufiq Suwaidi seemed
with the proposed anti-smuggling agre sheikh, who had no armoured
to think that it might be possible to operations, to share
cars, &c., to contribute to the propos 3 to t p a t the sheikh would not
the cost of these operations. It was po
be likely to agree to any such proposa . b 2
[430 e—2]
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