"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [ظ‎‎٢‎٥‎٥] (٦٦٠/٥١٩)

470 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
part in the early future, it puts an end to any possibility of an attack in great
strength upon Egypt from the side of Syria, and this brings us to the broad
strategical problems which counter-measures on our part involve.
In Annexure C are given details as to the landing facihties along the coast.
Given ample forces for the task, the. most satisfactory and effective plan
for putting an end to enemy attempts on a large scale against Egypt would
be the landing of a formidable expeditionary force in the Gulf of Iskanderun
and the cutting of all communication between the Cilician Gates on the west
and Marash and Aleppo on the east. (This, it should be noted, is almost as
effective an operation of war for guarding our position in Mesopotamia as
for guarding our position in Egypt.) That accomphshed, practically no troops,
no supplies, no fuel and no railway material could reach Palestine from
Anatolia ; it would, moreover, be difficult for troops to reach Palestine from
the Caucasian front and to supply them if they got there. From the naval
point of view, operations at this point offer no great difficulties. Ayas bay
on the north side of the gulf opposite Alexandretta is very well sheltered and
could be made immune against enemy submarines. Alexandretta itself would
make a satisfactory landing place for troops brought over from transports
in Ayas bay. A military operation such as this on our part would on the other
hand mean that the troops undertaking it would be exposed to attack from
the side of Anatolia and also from that of Armenia and Kurdistan, and that
they would be exposed to such attack pretty speedily, because they would
be planting themselves down comparatively speaking near to where the bulk
of the enemy forces now are. They would, further, have to occupy a consider
able area. In a word, such an operation could only be undertaken by a large
army, and that large army would have to remain if it was to fulfil its object.
If a force could be pushed up very rapidly from Ayas bay to the Cilician
Gates (80 miles) and could seize that strategic defile, it might be able to close
this all-important route to the enemy’s troops ; but it is doubtful whether
such an operation could be carried out before the opposing side had definitely
secured the pass, even if the landing itself met with no serious opposition.
The Admiralty would be unable to undertake their share of a joint expedition
to the Gulf of Iskanderun, while the Dardanelles operations are in progress.
Our sea power enables us to transport military detachments to a number
of points along the Syrian coast, e.g., Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa and Jaffa,
the relative advantages of these localities as landing places necessarily varying
consideiably. Expressing the position in general terms, it may be said that
the further south such an expedition forced a landing, the more time it would
have to consolidate itself before the enemy would receive large reinforcements,
while the further north it landed the more effectively it would be able to cut
the Syrian railway system, and the more completely it could cut off Turkish
forces now in Palestine from the rest of the Ottoman Empire.
But any project for undertaking military operations in Syria is necessarily
governed primarily by naval considerations. The view of the Admiralty Mar
Staff is that these conditions are adverse to military operations on any scale
larger than that involved in mere raids. There is no anchorage along the
Syrian coast like Ayas bay, where transports and warships can lie secure
both from bad weather and hostile submarines. The only port where dis
embarkation of troops and stores could be carried out in all weathers is Beirut;
this possesses an artificial harbour where small transports could discharge,
but it is a harbour which could very easily be destroyed by the enemy and is
only suited as a base for a force of a very few thousand men. Under favourable
weather conditions, military landings might no doubt succeed at various
points—about Acre and Haifa, for instance—at Jaffa and even possibly at
Gaza. But the winter is coming on, and any one of these disembarkation
operations might be interrupted at any moment. There are, moreover,
grounds for believing that preparations for defence exist both at Beirut and
at Haifa and that landings would be strongly opposed.
After careful consideration of the question, the Combined Staff are of
opinion that a military expedition into Syria of sufficient strength to penetrate.