"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [و‎‎١‎١‎٦] (٦٦٠/٢٤٠)

TURKISH MOVEMENTS DOWNSTREAM 201
and it did not appear to him that the situation there had
recently altered materially for the worse—General Young-
husband should not advance on Shaikh Saad till the 4th January.
The reason for this decision, which he communicated to
Generals Nixon and Townshend, was that much work still
remained to be done before the force advancing under General
Younghusband could be considered to be properly organised.
The news regarding the enemy dispositions on that and the
following three days was indefinite. On the 1st an aeroplane
reconnaissance from Ali Gharbi reported an enemy force
at Shaikh Saad, with detachments pushed five or six miles
downstream, which had constructed entrenchments on both
banks of the river. The whole enemy force there was roughly
estimated at 2,000 Turkish cavalry, at least 600 infantry,
and 1,000 Arabs. The next day General Townshend reported
that no signs of the enemy could be seen at Es Sinn, and that
he had come to the conclusion that the Turks had no force
downstream of Kut. He had heard that a fresh Turkish
division had reached Baghdad and he mentioned the arrival
downstream of the Firefly in Turkish hands * On the evening
of the 3rd January, General Townshend telegraphed that large
bodies of hostile troops, estimated at two divisions, were seen
moving down the left bank from the enemy’s camp upstream
at 4.45 p.m. ; and that this indicated a night attack upon him,
for which he was preparing. Next day, however, he reported
a quiet night and that the enemy movement reported the
previous evening was inexplicable, unless it was a night march
to Es Sinn. They could then see two bodies of Turkish infantry,
one about two battalions and the other half a battalion,
digging trenches a few miles eastward of Kut, roughly astride
the direct road on the right bank of the river leading from
Shaikh Saad.
On the 29th December General Nixon had sent General
Aylmer his instructions for the forthcoming operations.f
In these General Aylmer was told to begin his advance with
all the available force at his disposal on or about the
3rd January. His primary object was to effect the relief of
General Townshend’s force at Kut, while his secondary object
was to cover the concentration at Kut of further reinforce-
* General Townshend said that there was a very strong rumour among the
Arabs that one of the two breechblocks of the Firefly’s 4 • 7-inch gun had been
left on board. This was found subsequently to be true, the breech-block being
a spare one which had been kept below,
t Sent by hand of an officer.