"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎١] (٦٦٠/٢٠٩)

174 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
improvements were being carried out to the defences of Kut
town, where General Townshend was apprehensive that he
might finally have to make a house to house defence.
On the night of the 14th/15th the garrison of Woolpress
village made a small successful sortie, in which they drove
the enemy out of a trench he had occupied within two hundred
and fifty yards of the village.
On the 14th December General Townshend estimated that
the Turkish force investing him amounted to roughly 12,000
men, with 33 guns. This estimate was confirmed by an aero
plane report sent him by General Aylmer. Of this total of
12,000, General Townshend placed some 8,500 on the left
bank of the river (including 3,000 in the Turkish front line
trenches), 1,500 scattered round Kut in small detachments on
the right bank ; and 2,000 horsemen on the left bank. These
latter, however, were seen on the 15th afternoon moving down
the right bank towards Es Sinn.
On the 18th December information was obtained from
prisoners that the Turkish force was still only composed of
the four divisions which had fought at Ctesiphon, but that
two more divisions, the 26th and the 52nd, were expected
daily. General Townshend, who had known that the 52nd
Division was expected to have completed its concentration at
Baghdad, was considerably perturbed at this news and he
telegraphed to General Nixon saying that he trusted that
the Russians were being asked to menace Baghdad seriously
and thus take the strain off Kut.
On the 20th December the effective combatant strength
of the Kut garrison amounted to 9,185.
Kiesling gives in his book the text of a report on the
situation sent by Goltz to Constantinople on this date (20th).
In this he reported that the situation was worse than he had
expected. Although the 51st and 52nd Divisions had arrived,
he saw little chance of success against a determined co
ordinated advance by the British and Russians. The Turkish
infantry present were the best of the three arms, but the
artillery were inferior and were armed with old guns and old
ammunition, and the engineers were indifferent. Goltz con-
51 k r -r ^ >ers ^ an P r °ject could only be undertaken as
su si diary to the operations in Mesopotamia. Kiesling says
that Goltz had come to the conclusion that it would be im
possible to carry Kut by assault, and that the Turkish force
was not strong enough to invest Kut and at the same time
etach a force downstream to oppose the British relieving force.