"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [ظ‎‎١‎٥] (٦٦٠/٣٧)

8
HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
minute on an advance to Baghdad, as he anticipated that the
question would be revived owing to the victory at Kut. He
advocated a policy of caution and prompt orders to General
Nixon not to advance; for though it was possible, he said,
that General Nixon’s present force was strong enough to expel
the Turks from Baghdad, he did not consider that the force
was strong enough to hold it against possible Turkish attacks
later on and an evacuation then by the British might have
disastrous political effects. He was of opinion that it would be
incurring unjustifiable risks to go to Baghdad unless we could
reinforce General Nixon with a complete division and one or
two cavalry regiments.
, By this date Mr. Chamberlain had received Lord Hardinge’s
private letter of the 10th September, in which the Viceroy
had advocated the formation in Egypt of a reserve provided
‘ by the Indian divisions from France ; and in which he had
pointed out the decrease in India’s military strength, the
growth in India’s responsibilities, and how improvisation in
India had practically reached its limits ; he had also explained
that the situation in India was slowly deteriorating, and as it
might at any moment become critical it gave cause for anxiety
as to the future. Lord Hardinge’s review of the situation
caused Mr. Chamberlain considerable apprehension. It indi
cated more anxiety on the Viceroy’s part than Mr. Chamberlain
had been led to expect. Moreover, it reached him at a time when
sudden changes and developments in the European situation
were an additional disturbing influence.
On the 4th October, Mr. Chamberlain wired officially to
India: . I shall be glad to know what Nixon’s present
intentions are, as if, owing to navigation troubles, there is no
probability of catching and smashing the retreating enemy,
there is no object in continuing the pursuit . . . The
telegram went on to say that the previous orders as to a cautious
policy in Mesopotamia still held good, “ subject to course of
events at Baghdad and elsewhere and to the recommendations
you now make; ” and concluded by asking tor an estimate of
the enemy’s strength in Mesopotamia. Mr. Chamberlain
supplemented this official telegram with a private one to Lord
Hardinge in which he said that the latter’s private letter of the
10th September seemed to render it imperative to stop General
Nixon s further advance ; and he asked for an early communi
cation of the Viceroy’s views.
Mr. Chamberlain s views at this period were further expressed
in his weekly private letter of the 7th October. It was, he