ملف ٣٥١٦\١٩١٤ الجزء ١٤ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس؛ الوضع العام" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٦] (٥٣٢/٢٧٦)

however, he possible for us to succeed in representing guarantee of their
territory as advantageous, although it is possible Khans might view such
guarantee as a limitation of their expansion in future, especially when taken
in coniunction with our stipulation (s) respecting Liravi territory. Contem
plated promise of assistance to obtain appointments for them as Governor mig t
prove embarrassing to us in (future ?) when ( ?) zone disappeared. _ Only
available provinces in our gift will be Kerman (and ?) Yezd. In Cox s original
sugnestion the one solid attraction for Khans was guarantee ot Ispahan
Governorship and that being now ruled out small residue would give compact
of not much value in their eyes. Moreover, question of Ispahan is to them ot
such importance that it would come up inevitably in course of negotiations
and from our refusal to give guarantee respecting Governorship no evasion on
our part would avail to prevent Khans from deducing^ the conclusion that
Ispahan is to fall definitely under influence of Russian Government. On
our relations with Khans the effect of this would be disastrous.
3. Tor reasons given Consul-General Graham could not conduct nego
tiations with Illkhani and Illbegi. Negotiations would have to be conducted
in Tehran where two most important Khans now are and where Sirdar Jang
will very soon ioin them. To negotiate with tribe, without letting them and
all Persia see too far into our band, will, I think, be impossible, but I also
think that without running above risk we can probably get assurances on
some of points suggested by Cox, though I do not attach much value to such
assurances, even'if we can obtain them. As a more practical and ess
dangerous course I would suggest that Graham and Doctor Young in Bakhtian
(country and ?) in Tehran (should?) endeavour to keep'tribe loyal to us by
secret (?) service inducements. Khans are displaying a more satisfactory
disposition here than they have shown for some time past.
Addressed to Foreign Office; sent to India, Ahwaz and Basrah.
46
Telegram P., dated (and received) the 8th October 1915.
From-LIEUTENAUT-COLONBL C. T. Ducat, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at
Kerman,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
There is nothing to report.
47
Telegram P., No. 138, dated the 7th (received 9th) October 1915.
From— His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
rp 0 fph e Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
Consul at Shiraz sends following message which is addressed to you
No 77 (and with which)? I entirely agree:— Begins. In general terms I
have explained in my telegram No. 353 to Tehran the nature and purport of
the measures hitherto adopted by me.
As desired I now submit the following further details :—Ex-Gorernor-
General had long ago in German interests been engineering an agitation against
us and had succeeded by means of the democratic party of which he was head
in organising in town of Shiraz force over two thousand persons who were ready
to carry (out) his programme. Besides this the Gendarmerie were hostile to us
and manv Mullas were with him. A considerable force locally hostile to our
interests was thus at his disposal. Before the occupation of Bushire matters
were serious enough, but they became critical (after ?) that event. The occu
pation of Bushire was used by pro-German(s) as a useful^pretext for more active
agitation and under Gendermerie officers a corps of local volunteers was
organised. Matters were made still more difficult owing to a lack of respons-
ibfe Government. Threats which were made against us daily culminated in
the murder of Vice-Consul.