"ملف ٦/٤ II الحدود الكويتية-العراقية" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٣] (٤٤٠/٢٨٥)

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Political, Kuwait,
^ 0 Pg^» Bahrain.
Prom
To
No.C/444
Dated the 16th June, 1947.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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P 1 :.
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Reference your telegram No.667 dated the 9th June,
1947. Kuwait - Iraq Frontier.
2. In 1939 the then Political Resident was of the
opinion that a demarcation of the frontier would render less
likely Iraqi incursions into Kuwait for which His Majesty’s
Crovernment had been able to obtain no satisfaction^vide
- Residency telegram No.80 dated the 29th January, 1939 and
/H' Residency express letter No.C/94 dated the 22nd February, 1939.
Since then the incursions have continued and we have been no
more successful in obtaining satisfaction for the Shaikh:
and this in spite of the fact that there have been British
advisers attached to the Iraq police who have done their
utmost to prevent such incidents, and in spite of the
presence in Iraq since 1941 of British forces and a pro-
British Gtovernment. In my view nothing has occurred since
1939 to make a demarcation of the frontier any less desirable,
3. Should there be in the future, as a result of the
revision of the present treaty with Iraq or for any other
reason, no British advisers, or advisers of some other
nationality, in Iraq, I anticipate that the situation would
become much graver. I understood from Colonel Sargon of
the Iraq Police on his visit here two years ago that, as his
police were incapable of reading or understanding a map,
there was little prospect of their respecting the frontier
until it was demarcated.
4. Both the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Kuwait Oil
Company are fully occupied in developing promising oil
fields at some distance from the frontier, but it is probable
that when proved fields are fully in production intensive
exploration at new levels will be begun and the companies
may then take an active interest in the frontier area.
Demarcation would seem likely to proceed more smoothly now
when the area is not considered vitally important from an
oil point of view than at some later date when this position
may have changed.
5. The Umm Qjasr Port project appears to be dormant
for the present and therefore unlikely to complicate or
embitter the demarcation operations.
6. The frontier where it follows the Batin Is marked
by an unmistakeable natural feature and it would seem that
demarcation here is not urgently required, provided that
Iraq agrees that it follows the thalweg and instructs her
officials accordingly. Similarly the frontier once it
reaches the Khor Abdullah does not seem to require demarca
tion. The section where incidents have occurred in the past
and are most likely to recur in the future is the comparat
ively short one between the Batin and the Khor Abdullah,
the demarcation of which would not, I suggest, present any '
considerable physical difficulties, or involve much expense.
7. It is clear that the accurate definition of the
frontier will present questions on which Iraq and Kuwait