"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٧‎٥] (٢٩٤/١٥٤)

serious risks from rifle fire which was frequently intense, and many
aircraft were hit. The risk was all the greater if fire could be opened
before the enemy had been located and when the aircraft was flying at
cruising speed low down. The cover afforded by olive groves and scrub
gave the rebels a good chance of achieving this surprise. The tactics
adopted to minimise the effect of such measures consisted of flying at a
high speed in suspected areas when below 500 feet and delivering a bomb
attack immediately hostile riflemen were located v/ith a view to breaking
their resistance from'the start. The performance of the Hart type of
aircraft enabled these tactics to be carried out with success in the hill
country. In such districts the tendency to employ too many aircraft at
one time had to be carefully resisted: if more than two aircraft were
engaged the attention of the pilots was distracted by the necessity of
keeping a close look-out to avoid collision, and this added to the
difficulties of locating the enemy while flying low along wadis . The
difficulty was great enough already, since the Arab credited the airman
with an all-seeing eye and only too often tended to go to ground the
moment an aeroplane appeared overhead.
The restrictions imposed upon the use of aircraft weapons added
still further to the difficulties already presented by the nature of the
operations. It was not until the rebellion was more than two months
old that the use of bombs was authorised. Even then it was confined
to the 20-lb bomb within certain defined areas and under certain speci
fied conditions only, while any bombing within 500 yards of the "out
skirts of a town, or a village or a building" was prohibited. As time
went on negotiations with the civil authorities were successful in
securing a gradual extension of the bombing areas, but for some time
all requests for authority to use heavier bombs or to bomb buildings
from which fire was being directed met with steady refusal. As the
rebels later tended to fire from stone sangars or from the outskirts of
villages, these restrictions imposed a very serious handicap upon air
action. It was not until three aircraft had been shot down in one day
under such conditions that in September the very limited use of the
112-lb bomb was authorised, but no bombing of buildings - even after
their evacuation - was at any time permitted. Machine-gun fire from
aircraft was normally allowed to be used against aimed rebels in _the
open, but it was not until the last weeks of the rebellion that per
mission was received to fire upon houses from which rebel file was
being directed.
The method of attack normally used by aircraft was evolved to suit
these special conditions. To obtain the maximum effect bo mac me
gun and bomb attack had to be delivered at a low altitude where the
enemy was clearly visible, and the dive method was employe . e
attack was made at high speed and the bombs released a ee °
below. If the first attack dispersed the enemy they were then picked
off with the front gun, while if they retained cohesion a second bomb
machine-gun dive attack was delivered which usually drove _
cover. They were then bolted from cover with the om ^ ^
by the front gun. Against armed men in sangars, thick oil S
caves the 112-lb bomb with a 12-second delay action tail fuze p
be the best weapon.
Night operations by aircraft were limited to flights in
Area connected with the protection of Jems h oolonies ‘ In
the aircraft and the dropping of parachute f f 1-6 ® ^ 00n .
S.O.S. had a certain moral effect, but i 15 fourid that, however
tinued once the enemy had got used ^ fire ac tion by thoir light
accurately the flares were 4r°PP®i» ? f £ h * ni ^ ht rations of this kind
v/as impracticable, and results showed t: 0
can seldom be justified.
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