"الدروس العسكرية المستفادة من الثورة العربية في فلسطين في سنة ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٨] (٢٩٤/٢٠)

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IllLITiJiY LESSONS OF TIS APAB PJEliELLIOIT D: ?AI£STH^ 1956
CHAPTER I
IHTRCDUCTION
The Arab Rebellion in Palestine started on the 19th April 1936 and
ended ’'officially" on the 12th October, although widespread lawlessness
on a smaller scale continued for long afterwards. Although primarily
the outcome of a conflict between Arab and Jewish Nationalism, the revolt
was definitely anti-Government and anti-British in character; it was in
fact - to quote the statement of H.M. Government on the 7th September
1936 - " a direct challenge to the authority of the British Government in
Palestine ". The Jews ranged themselves on the side of the Mandatory,
the Arabs for the most part against it, while the neighbouring mandated
territory of Trans-Jordan under the friendly hand of the Amir Abdullah
remained undisturbed and remarkably disinterested. During the six
months that it lasted the Rebellion went through the successive stages
of violent rioting; a general strike and campaign of civil disobedience;
a campaign of terrorism and intimidation, in which the sniper the bomb
thrower and the gangster played a prominent part; widespread sabotage
with attacks on all forms of communications; and finally the formation
of bands of armed men and the conduct of a regular regime of guerilla
warfare under a self-styled "Commander-in-Chief". In its course it
took toll of the lives of 28 British combatants, 80 Jewish civilians and
over 1000 Arabs: the British and Jewish wounded totalled more than 500;
and the direct cost to the taxpayers of Palestine - apart from millions
in loss of trade - was estimated at £3g- million. Of the latter the
saboteur accounted for some £300,000, while in a naturally treeless
country which derives its main wealth from its fruit products 200,000
trees and 3,500 acres of crops were wantonly destroyed. In the task of
restoring order two infantry battalions, two squadrons of aircraft, a
company of armoured cars and the Trans-Go rdan Frontier Force were
available at the outset for duties which in six months had absorbed the
greater part of two Divisions, as well as four squadrons of aircraft and
detachments from various ships of the Mediterranean Fleet.
Such then was the character of the Palestine Rebellion of 1936.
Though it had its novel features it was in the main like many others
which it has fallen to the lot of British forces to^ quell in the past,
and much of its history may repeat itself in any which recur in the^
future. A study therefore of the successes and the failures of British
arms in Palestine during this period may contribute towards the shorten
ing of similar operations and the saving of life and effort on another
occasion. That is the object of this book.
A firm warning is however necessary regarding the method of applying
these lessons elsewhere. In reading the following pages it is most
necessary that two important factors, which influenced every thought and
deed at the time, should be kept constantly in mind. The first is the
special condition under which the fighting forces were employed.^
Throughout the whole period - even when engaged in open warfare he
hills - troops and aircraft were still only acting in aid of the civil
power with all the consequent restrictions; these restrictions naturally
varied widely according to circumstances, but at no time were the armed
forces free to make the fullest use of the weapons at their disposal.
The second factor is the nature of the opponent. The Palestinian Arab
is not a fighting man: even when led and reinforced by trained and
experienced individuals from Iraq, Syria and Transjordan, the rank and
file still retained their characteristics of carelessness, lack of enter
prise, and a wholesome regard for their own skins. They had none of the
military qualities of, for instance, the tribesmen of the North-West
frontier of India. As a rule they were indifferently armed and