"العراق والخليج الفارسي" [و‎‎٢‎١‎٢] (٨٦٢/٤٢٨)

MODERN IRAQ 311
British had not exaggerated the impossibility of holding a plebiscite
in Kurdistan and the difficulty of discovering true local opinion even
by secret inquiry. Tribesmen and peasants referred the Commission
to their chiefs and landlords, who in turn were dominated by the fear
of reprisals if they spoke for the losing side. The Commission’s
report rejected the Turkish claim mainly on economic and historical
grounds, including the economic unity of the three vilayets and the
fact that Mosul had for long periods been dependent on the Pashas
of Baghdad (pp. 259 ffi). But the proposed award of Mosul to Iraq
was made conditional on the protection by Britain of the local rights
and usages of the Kurds, who, it was found, had no sympathy for
Arab rule as such, and the prolongation of the mandate for twenty-
five years. The frontier claimed by the British was rejected and a line
closely approximating to the Brussels line recommended instead.
This decision pleased the Turks but created a fresh problem, that
of the Assyrian refugees. The British had claimed territory north of
the old vilayet in order to include the valleys of the Assyrian refugees
and to restore to them their old homes.
The Commission’s report was adopted by the League Council,
which was much influenced by the harsh measures adopted by the
Turks towards their own rebellious Kurds in 1925, and though the
Turks protested to the last they eventually accepted the inevitable; in
1926 a tripartite treaty was concluded between Great Britain, Iraq,
and Turkey by which Turkey agreed to the Brussels line (with slight
modifications) and the neutralization of the frontier. This friendly
agreement, the Treaty of Ankara, was supplemented in 1937 by the
Saadabad pact (p. 318). The contentious oil factor in all these
negotiations is mentioned later, p. 493. The frontier is described
on pp. 1 ff.
Iraqi Methods. The Kurdish problem was stirred up afresh when
Britain proposed the termination of the mandate. The League was
inundated by Kurdish petitions, mostly demanding an increased or
a total amount of local autonomy, but occasionally complaining that
the Iraqi Government did not fairly carry out the administrative
measures made in 1925. More had in fact been promised in vague
phrases than could be performed in fairness to the Iraqi State, and
the League found it necessary to limit Kurdish claims to purely local
matters affecting the use of languages, control of education, and the
appointment of local officials. The Iraqi Government, which was
made to offer guarantees in this respect (p. 298), has, while generally
‘leaving well alone’, consistently maintained that it is necessary for