"العراق والخليج الفارسي" [و‎‎١‎٩‎٣] (٨٦٢/٣٩٠)

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 275
failure of the British to press their advance, under orders from
the government at home, caused the more friendly Arabs to change
their mind.
The Tigris rose exceptionally in February 1915, a month earlier
than usual. The controlling banks above Qurna were broken and
most of the British troops had to withdraw to Qarmat Ali. The
Turks were almost as much hampered as the British, because the
floods which spread over the area west of Basra limited the Turkish
counter-attack to the desert south of the Hammar lake, and when it
was made on 11 April it had already been anticipated for some time.
The combined Turkish and Arab force, in numbers greatly superior
to the British, was heavily defeated at Shuaiba, and though after
four days’ fighting the British could not pursue, the Arabs turned
on their erstwhile allies, robbing and murdering the stragglers in
flight. Thus all threat to Basra from this side was over for the time
being.
Simultaneously there had been trouble on the Ahwaz flank, where
the Bakhtiari Khans and local Arabs had been incited to co-operate
with the Turks. German agents were also active in southern Persia.
A small force had been sent to Ahwaz which prevented serious trouble
until the battle of Shuaiba was won, but it then became necessary
to free this flank from further danger, restore the supply of oil which
had been interrupted, and drive the Turks out of Persian Arabistan.
These objects were successfully accomplished during April and May.
Capture of Amara. The operations under General Townshend
which followed and led to the capture of Amara were among the
most extraordinary of the war. The Turks occupied a strong defen
sive position about 7 miles north of Qurna with advanced posts on
sandhills 4 miles in front of it, the whole marshy country on both
sides of the Tigris as far as Qurna being flooded to depths of from
1 to 3 feet, and much of it overgrown with reeds. The flanks were
secure, and there was no other course but to make an amphibious
frontal assault. During May sailors and sappers at Basra prepared
rafts and attached shields to heliums (native boats), while the infantry
practised themselves in handling and manoeuvring the boats. The
attack began early on 31 May, when day ‘shade’ temperatures ranged
over ioo°, the assaulting troops, engineers, field ambulances, signal
units, and mountain guns being carried in 372 heliums. Field-guns
and howitzers were mounted on horseboats and rafts, and the opera
tion was also supported by fire from sloops, tugs, and launches on
the main channels and by any other vessel that could mount a gun.