"العراق والخليج الفارسي" [و‎‎١‎٩‎١] (٨٦٢/٣٨٦)

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 271
the British officer with the emir, who was killed in an indecisive battle
between Ibn Sand and Ibn Rashid in 1915 (p. 318).
In general, the Arabs were opportunists, waiting on events; they
harassed the Turkish communications in 1915 when the British drove
past Kut to Ctesiphon; in the winter of 1915-1916 they were even
more menacing in rear of the British during and after the siege of Kut.
It was during the hot weather of 1916 that the Turkish commander
unofficially proposed an armistice with the British to enable both to
punish the Arabs, so that in the coming winter the two armies could
concentrate on each other unmolested by third parties. This sugges
tion was not accepted, and from 1917 onwards the Arabs were more
troublesome to the Turks than to the British. Nevertheless, Ajaimi,
the powerful chief of the Muntafiq tribes espoused the Turkish
cause to the end. Unlike elsewhere, it was not the policy of the
British Government to compromise the future, and, though the Chief
Political Officer more than once advised that a statement of policy
should be made, guaranteeing Arab freedom from Ottoman misrule,
no proclamation was made until after the capture of Baghdad in
March 1917, by which time victory in Iraq was assured without
their help.
Lack of Preparations
Neither the British nor the Turkish operations were the result of
planning in times of peace. Probably no staff exercise had ever taken
place in India, even on paper, having as its aim the landing of an
expeditionary force at the head of the Persian Gulf; but the Turks
were equally unprepared. They were almost as ignorant of the
country beyond the river banks as were the British; the navigation of
the Tigris to Baghdad was better known to the British than to the
Turks—the buoying and survey of the channel being a British
obligation (p. 269)—but there were no accurate maps, either Turkish
or British, of the country away from the rivers. British intelligence
and maps were based on consular reports and on the accounts of
a few travellers and archaeologists, some good and reliable, but many
very old. On the excellent maps made by British and Indian sur
veyors during the campaign both armies came to rely for detail. 1
This lack of preparation is extraordinary, but the blame cannot be
laid on the Services, which in peace-time were starved of funds. The
1 In referring to the capture of Major Reilly in November 1915, the official
Turkish account records that his sketch-map of the Tigris, from the Diyala to
Aziziya, ‘was an important map in the eyes of the Iraq Command, for at headquarters
and with the troops there was no such thing as a map’.